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Abstract 
 
The Remuneration Committee and the executive’s compensation practices have been 
the subject of several studies for the past decades, due to their crucial and recognized 
impact on the company’s organization. More recently, these issues have attracted 
considerable public attention due to the latest corporate scandals observed worldwide. 
The aim of this study will be to examine the non-executive’s remuneration and how this 
might be affected by the characteristics of the Remuneration Committee, mainly by 
analysing the impact of its level of independence.   
Several studies have been developed focusing on the design and structure of the 
executive remuneration schemes. However, regarding the specific case of the non-
executive remuneration and its potential relation with the Remuneration Committee, the 
empirical evidence is either insufficient or lacking significance. By studying the 
Portuguese case, we will try also to analyse the CMVM’s (Comissão de Mercado de 
Valores Mobiliários - Portuguese Securities Market Commission) recommendations on 
this topic and understand their impact on the non-executive remunerations.  
Our main findings lead us to conclude that the non-executive’s total remuneration per 
capita is positively influenced by firm’s size while its relation with firm’s performance 
is insignificant in what concerns total or fixed pay, but significantly negative in terms of 
variable pay. Unlike the multinational factor, which revealed a strong and positive 
impact on the level of non-executive’s compensation, we did not observe any evidence 
that the independence status of the Remuneration Committee had a significant influence 
on non-executive remunerations. Also we did not find evidence that the likelihood that a 
firm pays exclusively a fixed salary to non-executive directors (as recommended by 
CMVM and other issuers of governance recommendations) was influenced by the 
firm’s size, ownership structure, by the multinational factor or by the Remuneration 
Committee structure. 
 
Key-words: Remuneration Committee, Non-Executive’s Compensation, Independent 
Directors.
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Introduction 
In public companies, which might be characterized by having management separated 
from ownership, there is an on-going inherent risk of having non-concordant objectives 
between the management and the shareholders (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). As so, the 
set of possible tools that can bring a considerable level of control over the management 
has led to the concept of Corporate Governance.  
For the past decades, a substantial attention has been devoted to the area of Corporate 
Governance, but this interest has been recently re-launched by the latest financial 
scandals also related to the possible high and unadjusted compensation schemes verified 
worldwide. 
Nowadays, the Remuneration Committee may be seen as a mechanism of corporate 
governance within a company, allowing a better alignment of interests between 
shareholders and the management (Silva, 2009). Furthermore, it is frequently perceived 
as a useful tool in order to design more adequate compensation schemes inside a 
corporation (Main and Johnston, 1993; Conyon et al., 1995).  
In the last decade, we have observed a renewed interest on this topic mostly related to 
the higher number of financial collapses of large corporations worldwide, arguably due 
to accounting fraud and bad management, such as Enron and WorldCom. In fact, the 
2008 financial crisis was the latest manifestation for an on-going debate that has 
dedicated a substantial attention to this subject as a balanced and consistent 
remuneration policy can be seen as an incentive to better control the management team 
inside a corporation. This recent financial crisis called the attention to the importance of 
a firm-level governance for the economy as a whole, illustrating the consequences 
which went “above and beyond the individual firms involved” (Edmans, 2013, pp. 2).  
Several studies have been made about the executive’s remuneration and how it should 
be designed. However, there is little evidence regarding the specific case of the non-
executives’ remuneration and its potential relation with the firm’s characteristics, 
specifically with the Remuneration Committee’s structure.  
In addition, following a reality associated with financial problems and corporate 
bankruptcies which have strongly questioned existing corporate models, the role played 
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by non-executive directors inside a corporation has become more critical since these 
might have the ability to help solving at least, part of the observed problems.  
Motivated by the recent scandals in the area of Corporate Governance and by the lack of 
studies relying on non-executives remuneration, this study will be centred on the 
Portuguese market, aiming to understand whether the non-executive’s compensation is 
affected by the Remuneration Committee structure, by linking the non-executive 
remunerations with the Committee’s characteristics and mostly by analysing the 
proportion of the independent directors. 
Recent research has been focused in understanding the directors’ remuneration policies 
and how these may be influenced by distinct factors such as the firm’s performance, the 
company’s size and the stock market behaviour. However, some authors agree that 
further studies and more robust conclusions are necessary, since the empirical evidence 
is contradictory or lacks statistical significance.  
This study may be particularly interesting in a country like Portugal where corporate 
governance is developed mainly based on issued recommendations, where few rules or 
specific laws are defined and where recent governance scandals have also been recently 
observed (e.g. Banco Espirito Santo (BES), Portugal Telecom (PT) and Banco 
Português de Negócios (BPN)) and much discussed.  
The structure of this study will proceed as follows. The first section will present a 
literature review, followed by a description of the methodology used, including the 
variables’ description, as well as the descriptive statistics. The third section presents 
several regressions estimated and the associated results aiming to determine which 
factors better contribute for the explanation of the remuneration of the non-executive 
directors. The last section will present the major conclusions, limitations of the study 
and the main avenues for further research. 
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1. Literature Review 
1.1. The concept of Corporate Governance 
Nowadays, organizations can be defined as “simply legal fictions which serve as a 
nexus for a set of contracting relationships among individuals” (Jensen and Meckling, 
1976, pp. 8). According to the White book (Livro Branco in Portuguese) about 
Corporate Governance (Silva et al., 2006), firms are also seen as a conjunction of 
contracts and juridical relations which allow limiting the owner’s responsibility. 
Moreover, due to the high complexity of these relationships between all the entities 
involved, the so called stakeholders, Corporate Governance gained a notable importance 
on the business world.  
For the past 25 years, Corporate Governance has been under intense research and 
discussion, for both the popular and business press, but it has recently gained a 
particular interest due to the latest financial scandals verified worldwide. As a result, we 
believe it is important to define Corporate Governance, even though there isn’t a 
worldwide consensus regarding the definition itself - “There are no universally agreed-
upon standards that determine good governance” (Larcker and Tayan, 2011, pp. 10). 
In theory, the concept of Corporate Governance descends from the classic paradigm of 
the corporation and the power of the ownership (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). In other 
words, the owner of a corporation has the right to govern the company, aiming to follow 
the value maximization principle, although an issue arises when there is a separation 
between management and ownership. The divergence of ownership and management 
originates agency risks and consequently agency costs. As a result, we can sustain that 
Corporate Governance surges as a natural solution to address this challenge. However, 
corporate governance control measures to discourage self-interested managers should be 
weighted against the agency costs associated and the ability to mitigate those (Larcker 
and Tayan, 2011).  
The definition is very broad and has been under intense development over time, with 
several authors contributing with their knowledge and results to this problematic. As the 
21
st
 century downed, following the evolution path observed in the society, corporate 
governance seems to be developing in order to be adequate and in line with the new 
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demands of the business world. As a result, it is currently possible to observe codes of 
principles or best practices in corporate governance in most countries with stock 
markets
1
, aiming to contribute to a sustained development and to avoid additional 
financial scandals and failures in the economy. The major reasons behind these codes 
and recommendations rely on the past episodes just mentioned, which transfers a lack of 
confidence over the financial information published and the level of efficiency of the 
supervising activities over listed firms, when in presence of deficient corporate 
governance practices.   
One of the most important reports addressing this topic was issued in 1992 by “The 
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance” and lead by Sir Adrian 
Cadbury – The Cadbury Report. It became significant in influencing thinking around 
the world, by drawing attention to the importance on the arrangement of company 
boards as well as its accounting systems, in order to mitigate the corporate governance 
risks and consequently failures. It was an initiative from the British Government and 
addressed a number of issues that were not dealt until that moment in time by the 
company law. After such report, additional documents were published all over Europe, 
such as Greenbury, Tumbul and Hampel (United Kingdom), Vienot I (France), Preda 
(Italy), Olivencia (Spain), Permers (Holland), Cardon (Belgium).  
The Cadbury Report defined Corporate Governance as “the system by which companies 
are directed and controlled” (pp. 14). Following this path, Larcker and Tayan (2011) 
defined corporate governance “as the collection of control mechanisms that an 
organization adopts to prevent or dissuade potentially self-interested managers from 
engaging in activities detrimental to the welfare of shareholders and stakeholders” (pp. 
8).  
According to OECD (Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 
2004), “Corporate Governance involves a set of relationships between a company’s 
management, its board, its shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate Governance 
also provides the structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the 
means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance re determined” (pp. 
11).  
                                               
1
 For example, “The Corporate Report” issued in 1975 by the ASSC (Accounting Standards Steering 
Committee), the “Cadbury Report” issued in 1992 and the Sarbanes-Oxley Act in 2002. 
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As regards to the White Book, Corporate Governance assumes the definition of “a set of 
authority structures and supervision of the exercise of that authority, internal and 
external, which aim to ensure that the company establish and materialize, effectively 
and efficiently, and action consistently with the contractual relations private purposes 
for which it was created and is maintained and social responsibilities that are 
underlying their existence” (Silva et al., 2006, pp. 12). 
Despite all the definitions already presented, many others exist in the literature. 
According to Chen et al. (2009) Corporate Governance can be described as a 
mechanism used to reduce agency and transaction costs (Macey, 1998), in order to 
better protect the shareholders against managers and/or controlling shareholders. As a 
result, the authors state that firms with better corporate governance structures should, in 
principle, have a higher valuation. Hail and Leuz (2006a) contradicted this theory 
stating that this effect is still unclear. 
Corporate Governance is a complex and dynamic system, involving an interaction 
between various agents. Therefore, in order to design an effective and adequate model 
of corporate governance, a broader context should be adopted, taken into consideration 
important aspects such as the company’s own characteristics, the social, cultural and 
political environment, the accounting standards, in between other specifics. The current 
changes in the business environment tend to difficult the attempts to define a standard 
definition for Corporate Governance (Larcker and Tayan, 2011). 
In summary, we can sustain that Corporate Governance is directly concerned with the 
way business corporations are governed and controlled. It is not only a question of 
management but also an issue of control. Essentially, Corporate Governance is about 
the way power is exercised over corporate entities and, it may differ across countries 
due to the political and legal environment which may result in different corporate 
governance structures (Li, 1994). Alves (2007) went further by encouraging that 
corporate governance main purpose is more than control and supervision but instead, 
involves all the available mechanisms to conduct the firm towards the achievement of a 
better performance.  
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1.2. Agency Theory and Corporate Governance  
In order to understand the concept of Corporate Governance, it is interesting to go back 
and understand when such a perception was created. Earlier on the 18th century, Adam 
Smith (1776) identified the agency problem as “The directors of such companies, 
however, being managers rather of other people´s money than of their own, it cannot 
well be expected that they should watch over it with the same anxious vigilance with 
which the partners in a private copartnery frequently watch over their own.” (pp. 606 
and 607). This concept gained formally shape by Berle and Means (1932), on the 20th 
century, as these authors studied the evolution of corporations and the separation 
between ownership and control. 
One of the challenges of Corporate Governance is to address the Agency Problem. This 
topic was defined by Jensen and Meckling (1976) as “a contract under which one or 
more persons (the principal(s)) engage another person (the agent) to perform some 
service on their behalf which involves delegating some decision making authority to the 
agent. If both parties to the relationship are utility maximizers, there is good reason to 
believe that the agent will not always act in the best interests of the principal” (pp. 5). 
The authors segregate ownership and control in order to avoid situations where the 
agent, with no ownership over the firm’s resources, could possibly enhance self-
interested decisions that are suboptimal to the principal.  
Agency risk also arises from incomplete contracts, first defined by Fama and Jensen 
(1983).  In principle, it should be expected that a contract celebrated between the 
management and the shareholders could ensure the value maximization for the last ones. 
However, this situation is an ideal and a probably impossible scenario. Nowadays there 
is a strong need of having contracts as complete as possible otherwise, we would have 
non-concordant objectives (maximize the firm’s value and maximize the existing 
owner’s equity). The authors also studied the separation of management and ownership 
as a way to alleviate the agency problem.  
In the last decades, the Agency theory has been discussed in several contexts. In fact, 
some authors mention that the agency problems do not arise exclusively from the 
relationship between managers and shareholders. Indeed, there is the need to look 
beyond the contractual relations of the firm. This view encourages the existence of a 
16 
 
Corporate Governance models able to emphasize questions like social responsibility, the 
company’s environment and own characteristics, among other specific issues. The aim 
is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals, corporations and society, in 
a more complete and closer Corporate Governance model.  
 
1.3.  Non-executive Directors 
Fama (1980) once defined the non-executive directors as “professional referees” (pp. 
293) based on the idea that their function is to “stimulate and oversee the competition 
among the firm’s top managers” (pp. 294), having the encouragement to perform their 
tasks as monitors of the management team, as they want to develop and protect their 
reputations as experts (Fama and Jensen, 1983).  
Roberts et al. (2005) sustain the theory that non-executive directors should be 
“challenging but supportive, independent but involved” (pp. 6) arguing that they are 
vital considering their influence on the improvement of board effectiveness and due to 
the source of confidence they represent. The authors defend that “Whilst board 
structure, composition and independence condition board effectiveness, we argue that it 
is the actual conduct of the non-executive vis-à-vis the executive that determines board 
effectiveness” (pp. 6), by supporting their leadership and controlling their conduct. Non-
executive directors appear to be in between two masters – investors and executives, 
acting according to two different roles, in order to perform their tasks effectively. The 
authors end up by classifying the independent non-executive directors as proxies for the 
Board effectiveness. Likewise, they have characterized two types of Boards, defining 
what they called as “Minimalist Board” where conditions were specifically limited 
regarding the influence of non-executive directors; and the “Maximalist Board” where 
non-executive could actively provide their knowledge and exercise their influence over 
the company.  
If in some cases the Board is not capable of designing adequate remuneration schemes, 
Outside Directors
2
 must contribute by effectively monitor the management team, once 
                                               
2
 Non-executive directors can also be denominated as Outsiders. In fact, normally they are seen as the 
same person. However, there might be a small difference in cases where one non-executive director has 
previously been an executive director in the company. In this case, for several authors the director may be 
considered as an insider, as well as a non-executive.  
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they are less affected by the CEO (Chief Executive Officer) power inside the 
organization (Fama and Jensen, 1983). For instance, in the United Kingdom the non-
executive directors’ must work actively in order to ensure the integrity and credibility of 
the financial statements published (Peasnell et al. 1998). Additionally, outside directors 
perform their monitoring tasks, developing and protecting their reputation as experts.  
In 2012, a survey focused on the importance of reputation incentives, identified 
reputation risk as the top non-financial risk for corporate directors
3
. In fact, directors 
have their technical abilities and reputation being exposed. Vafeas (1999) and Yermack 
(2002) sustained the theory that outside directors might abandon under-performing 
firms, as a way to evade damaging their reputation, avoid legal liability and escape from 
the work involving restructuring an under-performing corporation. Also Fogel et al., 
(2014) defend that independent directors
4
 tend to protect their reputation as “damaged 
reputations hold fewer subsequent directorships and court personal responsibility” (pp. 
1). It is important to remind that highly qualified directors bear opportunity costs when 
joining a Board of a company. Typically, they more easily tend to prefer offers from 
well know firms, characterized by their high visibility in the market with the associated 
personal benefits, rather than smaller firms with a lower visibility where the challenges 
are expected to be higher and more demanding (Knyazeva et al., 2011).  
Recently, Masulis and Mobbs (2013) elaborated a particularly interesting study relating 
the quality of independent directors and its consequences over the board’s actions and 
firm’s outcome. The authors documented that stronger independent directors are 
expected to act more dynamically to avoid events which can be associated with the 
likelihood of damaging their reputation. As so, they argue that “boards with a greater 
percentage of talented, experienced and highly motivated independent directors, with 
stronger reputation incentives in their more visible directorships, should more 
effectively monitor and discipline CEOs to prevent very visible adverse firm outcomes, 
while promoting better board decision-making and positive firm outcomes” (pp. 4). 
                                                                                                                                         
 
3
 This survey was conducted by EisnerAmper LLP accounting and consulting firm. Between October 
2011 and February 2012 the opinions of 193 directors were analysed by web-based survey with the 
assistance of the National Association of Corporate Directors (NACD). The survey can be found at 
http://www.eisneramper.com/IT-Risk-Management-0512.aspx and it was discussed, in between others, on 
the Financial Working Paper nº 353/2013 published by the European Corporate Governance Institute.  
4
 The definition of independent director is described on section 1.4. 
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These conclusions corroborate Holmström’s (1999) prior evidence which identifies 
reputation as an incentive tool that may influence director’s actions in order to avoid 
risky decisions and adverse consequences, but to act on beyond of shareholder’s 
interests. Masulis and Mobbs (2013) documented that for independent directors whose 
reputation is highly valued, there is a positive relationship associated with firm 
outcomes, which can be reflected in distinct areas such as stock repurchases, dividend 
increases, better CEO appointment decisions and performance based CEO incentive 
contracts. Furthermore, they argue that “boards with busy directors who view a 
particular firm as one of their most important directorships are likely to make better 
decisions that are beneficial to a firm’s shareholders. On the other hand, firms with 
busy directors who view the board as relatively less prestigious are at a greater risk of 
having the board make poor decisions that are detrimental to shareholders” (pp. 7). 
However, as documented by Holmström (1999), it should also be taken into 
consideration that there might be a negative counterpart in the subject of director 
reputation incentives. Independent directors, who should monitor the top management 
teams, may face strong incentives to retain valuable directorships. Since CEOs have a 
strong influencing role in what concerns reappointments, directors may face strong 
incentives to avoid challenging the current CEO. In fact, as demonstrated by Masulis 
and Mobbs (2013), firms experiencing a high proportion of strong motivated 
independent directors are associated with higher CEO total compensation and to a 
greater equity based pay.  
Knyazeva et al. (2011) concluded that even though the proportion of outside directors 
on a firm’s board indicates the degree of board oversight, this metric does not provide 
sufficiently strong conclusions regarding the board’s competence or its ability to 
provide management with the necessary advices – “Outside directors with executive 
expertise may be better able to challenge a CEO and thus, be crucial to improving 
shareholder wealth” (pp. 19).  
Apart from the CEO power influencing the outside directors’ functions, other reasons 
might be in place that may affect the effectiveness of their job. For instance, if these 
directors have accumulated jobs in other companies or if they have insufficient 
information to work with, they may perform their tasks less effectively (Jensen, 1993). 
This opinion was also shared by Larcker and Tayan (2011) who suggested that non-
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executives may work with in an information disadvantage that can contribute to the 
decrease of their effectiveness, to an “information gap” and to directors not capable of 
recognizing looming governance problems. In fact, inside directors might be better 
informed than outside directors. Although non-executives have, in principle, fewer 
conflicts of interests in relation to the executive directors (also known as insiders), they 
typically present themselves with less firm-specific knowledge (Fama and Jensen, 
1983).  
Long et al. (2005) also contribute to this topic sustaining that the role of the non-
executive directors is often seen as that of a long-term decision maker, based on 
consensus, while Higgs (2003) describes as a guardian of the governance process.  
Additionally, they can also be described as defenders of shareholder’s interests, a role 
that assumes a particular importance in firms with diffuse ownership (Li, 1994). This 
last perspective was equally shared by Larcker and Tayan (2011), who suggested that 
outsider’s responsibilities are independent from those of management. This perspective 
is linked with the fact that outside directors are representing the shareholder’s interests, 
being responsible for providing advice about the strategy, not for elaborating it; to 
ensure the integrity of financial statements, not to make those, having no reporting lines 
to the company’s CEO. They are expected to provide advisory and monitoring 
functions, on both strategy and the business model, based on their professional 
background. As earlier described by Hamdani and Kraakman (2007), they are supposed 
to interpret a two way role by monitoring the management team and by being advisers 
when called to business decision making.  
The Sarbanes Oxley Act (2002) and the Financial Reporting Council (2003) lengthened 
the role of the non-executive members to other functions. They argued that besides the 
Board, non-executives should dominate on the audit and remuneration committees, 
where the conflicts of interests are most likely to occur.  
Beasley (1996) studied the non-executives from a fraud perspective. The author tested 
the relation between the proportion of non-executive members on the Board with the 
risk of having fraud financial statements. The results suggest that the higher the number 
of non-executive directors on the board, the less is the likelihood of having fraud firms. 
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The next section will be focused on prior studies developed, analyzing the non-
executive directors and their influence on distinct areas of a corporation. 
In contrast with all the definitions and importance attributed to non-executive directors 
presented so far, Core et al. (1999) concluded in favor of no evidence that independent 
non-executive members contribute to a more effective board, in comparison with 
executive directors.  
Some studies analyzed the relation between non-executive directors and their potential 
impact on the firm. Larcker and Tayan (2011) did not observe a clear relation between 
the non-executive directors and the compensation packages of the CEOs. In contrast, 
Nascimento (2009) by studying the Portuguese market, observed that the executive’s 
compensation is not determined by the level of independence of the Board‘s members 
but by firm characteristics, specially by the firm’s size. Regarding the role of non-
executive directors, the author concludes that the results obtained are unclear, 
suggesting that this might be linked with the fact that non-executive members may not 
be necessarily independent. As a result, they don’t have a strong monitoring role. 
Fernandes (2005), also by studying the Portuguese market concluded in favour of a 
significant relation between the non-executive members and the executive’s 
compensation. The author states that the higher the number of non-executive members, 
the higher will remunerations be, providing empirical evidence between 2002 and 2004, 
a period when the average pay of non-executive members doubled. However, Fernandes 
(2005) suggests they do not seem to have a strong monitoring role due to high 
compensation and limitations in terms of labour market, which do not provide 
incentives for non-executive members to fully act on behalf of shareholder’s interests. 
According to the author “high compensation, together with a lack of labor market 
suggests that there are few incentives for non-executive directors to really act as 
guardians of shareholders interests” (pp. 16). On the other hand, when firms perform 
successfully, outside directors may see their effort compensated by acquiring new 
directorships (Yermack, 2002).  
A similar conclusion was made by other authors: Core et al. (1999) studied the CEO 
compensation and firm performance for 495 observations in the U.S. and concluded that 
the CEO compensation is higher when we can find a higher percentage of non-executive 
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directors on the Board or when these non-executive directors are appointed by the CEO. 
This relation was equally documented by Lambert et al (1993) and Boyd (1994), who 
suggested that when there is a higher proportion of non-executive directors on the 
Board, executive’s compensation experiences a high association with firm performance, 
contrary to Finkelstein and Hambrick’s (1989) results. The size component was also 
shown to be important, with larger firms demanding “higher-quality managers with 
higher equilibrium wages” (pp. 379). The authors concluded that the Board’s and 
ownership structure had a significant impact on the CEO’s compensation. Based on the 
studies just mentioned, it is plausible to state that there is no academic consensus on this 
issue.  
In terms of mergers and acquisitions, Cotter et al. (1997) concluded that a higher 
number of non-executive directors may lead to better decisions when facing these kind 
of situations.  
Cosh and Hughes (1995) called the attention for the importance that independent non-
executive directors should have in restraining the compensation levels and in the 
alignment with shareholder’s interests. However, they concluded that for the UK, non-
executive directors have an “insignificant or perverse effect” (pp. 20) over the CEO 
compensation. Yermack (2002), by studying a sample of firms in Fortune 500, 
concluded that 5% of the outside directors’ sample become, at a point in time, “grey” 
(pp. 23), by creating relationships with the firm’s CEO challenging their ability to 
monitor their decisions. By acquiring this status, the non-executive directors may lose, 
at least, part of the objectivity arising from their relative distance to the Executive Board 
members. The author argues that the number of firms for which an outside director may 
work for has a negative relationship with the level of their independence. The larger the 
number of firms, the higher is the probability of an outside director to become grey. In 
order to avoid this situation, NACD (1996) suggests mandatory retirement ages and 
term limits for directors. As regards this “grey” status, other authors share this opinion 
by stating that the close relationship between the CEO and the non-executive directors 
(since one has hired the other) contributes for an ineffective level of compensation by 
the Board of Directors (Crystal, 1991). This close relationship, might lead to an 
ineffective Board in what concerns compensation plans. 
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In what relates to shareholder’s and firm performance, interesting results were also 
achieved by a number of studies. As regards to shareholder’s wealth, there is a 
controversy surrounding the causality relation between this and board independence. 
Prior empirical studies report different conclusions which contribute to a mixed and 
contradictory interpretation of the results. For instance, Masulis and Mobbs (2011), 
Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) and Brickley et al. (1994) reported a positive correlation 
between outside directors and the shareholder’s wealth while on the other hand, Bhagat 
and Black (2002) provided evidence that firms with a higher fraction of independent 
directors do not achieve a better performance. They argued that low-profitability firms 
exhibit an increasing number of independent directors as a way to respond to the 
business problems. Other authors find mixed or insignificant results regarding the effect 
that independent directors have on the performance or shareholder wealth (Yermack 
1996; Klein 1998). 
In summary, it is plausible to argue that the presence of non-executive directors have 
positive and negative potential consequences on a company’s daily business, having the 
capacity (which may not always be used) to provide the firm with their knowledge, 
expertise and independence contributing to reduce agency costs and improve the firm’s 
performance. Nonetheless, it is reasonable to contend that outsiders may also operate 
under an information disadvantage which can reduce their effectiveness.  
 
1.4. The independence question 
The independence question has been one of the most debated issues in the last decades. 
The question is: how to define independence? How to evaluate the independence levels 
of the company’s directors?  
In several countries the concept of independence is present in codes of principles or best 
practices while in others, this definition may be established under the country’s law. In 
the Portuguese case, this definition is included on the CMVM recommendations (the 
last version concerns to 2013) as well as it is also included on the CSC (Código das 
Sociedades Comerciais, article 414º, nº 5).  
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Regardless the legal or regulatory system adopted in each country, this independence 
perspective is considered vital in order to have an effective advisory and monitoring 
capacity from the board members, including non-executive directors.  
We may define independent directors as those who don’t have any kind of relation with 
the firm for which they are working for (Baysinger and Butler 1985). This means that 
the independent member is not associated to any agent/interest capable of influencing 
his/her decision or monitoring role (CMVM, 2013). This requires that directors have not 
worked for the company in the past 3 years, do not own a substantial number of the 
firm’s shares, is not related to any employee or any relevant shareholder, do not earn 
any remuneration from the company, among other specifics. In other words, we may 
state that only individual characteristics such as education, personal values, experience 
and personal background should influence the process of recruiting. Example of 
independence may also include having no past or present relation with major suppliers, 
customers or service providers, no family or friendship relations with any member of 
the Board or its family. This independence status is similarly evaluated through the 
level at which a director is free from having conflicts of interests with the firm, leading 
to an inability to act solely on behalf of the firm’s interests (CMVM, 2013). This 
definition is likewise present on the Portuguese law (Art. 414º nº 5 CSC) which goes 
even further by limiting the participation on the firm’s capital up to 2% and by 
mentioning the incapacity of being independent members in case the person has been 
re-elected by more than 2 mandates, on a continuous form or not. It is equally related 
with the director’s capacity to oppose to the management, whenever it is necessary to 
(Larcker and Tayan, 2011). Regarding the specific case of the Remuneration 
Committee, according to Newman and Mozes (1999), it is only seen as independent if it 
excludes executive directors.  
Nonetheless, besides this independent status it is also valuable to mention that 
independent directors should evidence some prestige, professional experience, 
reputation, good communication skills and a good network of contacts for 
communication purposes (Mallin 2003). Going deeper into this topic, some 
characteristics of the Remuneration Committees focusing distinct areas of a firm have 
been object of study reporting some interesting conclusions. For example, regarding the 
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relation between independent members and the executive’s remuneration there are 
several and distinct opinions. 
Mehran (1995) documented that firms with a higher number of independent board 
members used higher compensation schemes, presumably as a way to motivate 
managers. Knyazeva et al. (2011) by studying a sample of U.S. firms (S&P
5
 1500) 
reported clear evidence of a relation between the number of independent directors on 
the Board and the proportion of equity based compensation in CEO total pay.  
Contrary, Daily et al. (1998), by studying 200 companies belonging to Fortune 500, 
observed no impact of the proportion of independent members of the Remuneration’s 
Committee over CEO compensation. More recently, Zhu et al. (2009) documented that 
for Chinese listed firms, board independence does have a significant relationship over 
the executive’s pay-performance relation. In fact, they found that the higher the number 
of independent members on the board, the more executive cash compensation is related 
with accounting and stock performance. Their results also suggest that independent 
members on the Remuneration Committee produce a good governance mechanism in 
order to set the optimal executive compensation and that the independent Board 
members work more effectively in setting the executive compensation term when there 
is a Compensation Committee able to provide useful help and information. Furthermore, 
by studying the Canadian market, Sapp (2007) concluded that there is a positive 
correlation between the number of independent directors on the Remuneration 
Committee and the CEO compensation. More recently, these conclusions were also 
confirmed by Chowdhury and Wang (2009), which documented a strong relation 
between the Compensation Committee independence and the CEO remuneration.  
In terms of size and performance, Li (1994) based on 398 firms located in Japan, 
Western Europe and the United States documented a positive relation between these 
two variables and the number of non-executive directors on the board.   
Knyazeva et al. (2011) evidenced a relation between the proportion of independent 
directors, firm size and the labour market supply. They argue that “smaller firms have a 
larger portion of independent directors who are locally based, consistent with the 
intuition that while high visibility firms have the luxury of tapping a wider, national 
                                               
5
 S&P stands for Standard & Poor’s. 
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director pool, less visible firms are constrained by the local supply of prospective 
directors“(pp. 16). The authors went further and following subsequent research, 
concluded in favour of a positive and significant relation between independent directors 
and the firm’s operating performance, as well as on the firm’s value, with economically 
meaningful conclusions.  
Hermalin and Weisbach (1998b) argue that board’s independence increases in response 
to the company’s poor performance. This means that during strong performance 
periods, there is an increase on the CEO bargaining power resulting in a decrease of 
board independence. In contrast, in periods characterized by poor performance and 
consequently, a decrease on the CEO bargaining power, the company’s top management 
decision maker (the CEO), is forced to accept the increase in the fraction of independent 
directors on the Board.  
More recently, Fogel et al. (2014) calls for the importance and impact of powerful 
independent directors inside an organization, encouraging that firms with stronger 
independent board members exhibit economic and statistical higher valuations, 
elevating the shareholder’s wealth being more effective and disciplined when it comes 
to monitor CEOs. These results are achieved “in part at least by preventing value-
destroying decisions such as economically unsound merger bids and excessive free cash 
flow retention, by meaningfully linking CEO pay to firm performance, and by forcing 
out underperforming CEOs” (pp. 19).  Independent board members provided with 
information from the social network are more capable of questioning and challenging 
the CEO’s performance, leading the company to stronger results.  
 
1.5. Compensation: determinants and impacts 
Agency theory has also been debated on the executive compensation scenario. As 
studied by Bebchuk and Fried (2003), the executive compensation has a two-way 
interpretation – if in one hand it can be seen as an instrument seeking to address the 
agency problem arising from the division between ownership and control, in the other 
hand, it can be perceived as a source of the agency problem itself. These interests can be 
partially aligned by making executive compensation dependent on firm’s performance 
(Murphy, 1999; Brunello et al. 2001). Following this perspective, Holmstrom (1979) 
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defends that the executive remuneration should ideally be grounded on other measures 
of performance which are as informative as possible.  
When the governance structure is less effective, the company becomes weaker with 
higher agency problems. In this scenario, the CEO earns a greater compensation and the 
firm performs worse (Core et al., 1999). An additional way of addressing the agency 
problem consists in having executives and shareholder’s interests aligned by conceding 
stocks and stock options to the CEOs (Hall and Liebman, 1998). A different perception 
is derived from the role of independent non-executive directors which can have an 
active and determinant role, by monitoring and controlling the executive behaviour, by 
supervising remunerations and sanctions, being alert to performance problems and by 
exercising decision control (Roberts et al., 2005).  
The executive’s compensation packages and the board’s remuneration may also be 
interpreted as a corporate governance instrument, due to their control effect over 
managers. They may similarly be designed in order to develop an incentive to have 
managers and shareholder’s interests aligned, making this an internal control tool 
towards managers (Menozzi et al., 2011).  
Compensation schemes may reveal a particular and important aspect in what refers to 
the attraction and/or maintenance of well and enabled directors (Silva, 2009), as well as 
to motivate the firm’s executives to perform their duties in accordance to the 
shareholder’s value maximization principle (Andersen and Bizjak, 2000). During the 
last years, the director’s remuneration and their functions have been strongly debated in 
the society, linking this topic with the Agency theory.  In fact, one of the goals of 
corporate governance is to address the agency problem, earlier formalized by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976). This problem relies on the fact that managers may engage on self-
interested activities that conflict with shareholder’s interests. One possible solution to 
address this issue may be providing managers a compensation that is aligned with their 
responsibility and functions inside a company. According to Larcker and Tayan (2011), 
the compensation packages should be designed in order to be “sufficient in terms of 
their level and structure to attract, retain, and motivate qualified executives to create 
shareholder or stakeholder value” (pp. 237) and must include a mix of short-term and 
long-term components, consistent with the firm’s characteristics and strategy. However, 
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this task is not so linear and simple to determine being sometimes difficult to find the 
appropriate candidate as well as the necessary compensation to attract him/her to the 
company. This approach of establishing the ideal compensation packages may be 
translated into different measures which may not be well perceived by everyone. The 
authors observed that often the pay schemes are established based on a benchmarking 
analysis, comparing their company with others of similar size, industry and geography, 
as a way to maintain the competitiveness regarding this topic in the market.  
In first place it should be discussed why compensation has been a controversial topic 
and has become the object of an international debate over the last years. According to 
Murphy (1999), there are three main reasons that have contributed for this widespread 
interest: the unquestionable rise in CEO remuneration (from 1970-1996 the 
compensation paid to the S&P 500 CEO has more than doubled); the wealth associated 
to the so called “excesses of the 1980s” (pp. 1) where the high pay-schemes were 
connected to the layoffs, corporate downsizing in between others; and finally, the “bull 
market of the 1990s” (pp. 1), where the CEO compensation was increasingly linked 
with the firm stock-price performance. The 80’s were characterized as a period of high 
inflation and rapid economic growth, with executive’s compensation following an 
increasing tendency. Over this period, there was a clear trend in what refers to the 
remunerations schemes. These started to flow from fixed salaries and annual bonuses 
towards a variable component aligned with long term firm performance and stock 
options, having some executives received (very) “generous payouts” (Larcker and 
Tayan, 2011, pp. 238).  
According to some critics, this problem is not isolated or spontaneous, it is actually a 
systematic issue, which has been in place along the past years. In order to express 
briefly this idea, Bebchuk and Fried (2005) earlier expressed that “the problems have 
not resulted from temporary mistakes or lapses of judgment that boards can be expected 
to correct on their own; rather they have stemmed from structural defects in the 
underlying governance structure that enable executives to exert considerable influence 
over their boards.” (pp. 2).  
During the last two decades, this subject has been under intense public criticism and 
after the corporate governance scandals that initiated in the beginning of century 21
st
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century, it was much intensified. It is currently perceived by the society that many 
boards have deliberated and accepted compensation plans that did not serve the 
shareholder’s interests (Bebchuck and Fried, 2005). Nowadays, we can still observe a 
common disagreement about the origin of such problems and on how to address them.  
Secondly, it should be defined what is remuneration about. The Remuneration 
Committee designs the compensation plans which are then approved by the independent 
directors of the full board. Usually, the executive’s remuneration is defined as the fixed 
and variable cash compensation component, but it may also include other variables, 
such as stocks, stock options, pension benefits, bonuses, in between others. In Portugal 
and regarding the specific case of non-executive directors, their remuneration should be 
solely composed by a fixed element, following the CMVM and the IPCG (Instituto 
Português de Corporate Governance) recommendations, avoiding the variable 
component.  
Taking into consideration Kaplan’s approach (2012) referring to the CEO’s 
remuneration, there are two identified ways of measuring compensation: the “estimated 
or grant-date pay” or the “realized pay”. The first approach includes the “salary, 
bonus, the value of restricted stock, and the estimated value of options issued that year” 
while the second, includes the “salary, bonus, the value of restricted stock, and the 
value of options issued that year” (pp.1).  
One of the most controversial topics regarding Corporate Governance relies on how 
should executive’s compensation be designed and whether compensation should reflect 
a pay-performance relation or not. This point is particularly sensitive as it is highly 
associated with the neo-classic view where executive compensation was seen as the 
solution for the Agency Theory between investors and managers (Holmström, 1979), 
earlier mentioned in this work. Following this perspective, Acharya et al. (2014) stated 
that having executive’s compensation correlated with firm’s performance could possibly 
solve the exiting trade-off resulting from the necessity of having incentivized managers 
and the desire of preventing “idiosyncratic risk” (pp. 5). 
Some studies focused on supporting or contradicting the earliest theory presented by 
Jensen and Murphy (1990a), where CEOs were paid like bureaucrats, having their 
compensation independent from the firm performance. Hall and Liebman (1998) 
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opposed this theory, by studying a sample of U.S. companies and including the impact 
of stock options on the compensation plans.  
Acharya et al. (2014) conducted a model where firms could incentive managers by 
allowing them to choose a pay for performance (attributing a reward for their good 
performance) and applying a corporate governance strategy where they would be 
punished if they performed badly. In a hypothetical scenario where firms didn’t have to 
compete with each other in order to attract the better managers, they could apply for an 
efficient combination of these two. However, due to the fact that managerial talent is 
considered scarce, this solution is not considered valid.  
As earlier expressed by Larcker and Tayan (2011), if we tie the fact that annual bonus 
and performance plans are related to operating performance and that, stock options offer 
compensation when executives trade stocks “in the money”, then it is plausible to affirm 
that, at some level, the relation pay-performance must exist.  
Anderson and Bizjak (2000) confirmed this theory as their data shows performance and 
compensation associated to each other, with stock options being part of the 
compensation plans. According to their results, the higher the proportion of outside 
directors on the compensation committee, the lower the fixed-based pay, but the greater 
was the option based-pay translating into a higher pay to performance sensitivity and 
high levels of pay. This theory was also reinforced by Murphy (1985) and Kaplan 
(1994), who suggested that compensation schemes should focus on the firm 
performance allowing the firm to, at least in theory, design an adequate system 
motivated in aligning the interests between managers and shareholders. Some authors 
sustain that especially the variable component linked with performance would 
contribute for the alignment of interests, following the Agency Theory principles. 
However, based on past studies, there is no evidence of managerial compensation to be 
linked with performance (Hall and Liebman 1998; Bebchuk and Fried 2003). One 
possible explanation for this lack of relationship may be interrelated with the likelihood 
that firms do not take as their main financing source the financial markets, having prices 
not as an appropriate measure of firm performance (Fernandes, 2005).  
Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009) determined for a sample of Portuguese 
companies that there was no empirical evidence of a positive relation between 
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executives’ remuneration and firm performance, in contrast to firm’s size which 
strongly affects the compensation levels, as mentioned previously. This conclusion was 
also evidenced for a sample of Italian companies by Brunello et al. (2001), where 
remuneration was higher for bigger firms. In addition, Nascimento (2009) documented 
that the variable component of the executive’s remuneration was the only one 
influenced by the firm performance. 
A number of prior studies referring to the United Kingdom market have demonstrated 
that executive pay is much more sensitive and affected by the firm’s size and changes in 
size, rather than measures of shareholder performance (Cosh 1975; Meeks and 
Whittington 1975; Main 1991; Conyon and Leech 1993; Main et al. 1994; Cosh and 
Hughes 1995).  
By studying the Remuneration Committee, compensation and the firm performance, 
Silva (2009) refers that some studies point out the fact that independent Remuneration 
Committees are more capable of designing appropriate compensation schemes. In fact, 
the author concluded that the Committee’s independence allows a better alignment of 
interests between the executive’s compensation and the firm’s performance, however, 
these two components by themselves, as also studied by Daily et al (1998) and Newman 
and Mozes (1999), are not considerably affected by the Committee’s independency.  
Also Cosh and Hughes (1995) succeeding previous researches (Cosh (1975), Gregg et 
al. (1993), Conyon and Leech (1993), Main et al. (1994)), present evidence consistent 
with company’s size influencing significantly executive pay, rather than other variables 
such as firm performance or earnings per share.  
According to Yermack (2002) this pay-performance relation does exist, but only for the 
case of non-executive directors. Regarding other types of compensation such as 
opportunities to obtain other board seats, these do not appear to have a stronger impact, 
in contrary to rewards and economic remuneration.  
More than linked to performance, Murphy (1999) suggested that the pay levels should 
be associated to measures of stock-based performance. This relation would be in 
alignment with the shareholder’s interests but it would traduce manager’s actions. As 
so, if goods actions were taken by the management team, we would possible observe a 
positive effect on stock returns.  
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Following previous studies, Core et al. (1999) expected that larger firms with larger and 
more sophisticated operations and, consequently, larger growth opportunities demand 
higher-quality managers, meaning that the quality component represents an increase in 
the final remuneration. The authors sustain that due to the strong power of the CEO in 
the Board of Directors, the Board is not capable of designing adequate compensation 
schemes as an attempt to maximize the shareholder’s value. Actually, this opinion was 
previously documented by Hill and Phan (1991), who suggested that the power 
exercised by the CEO could be used to limit and weaken board control.  
More recently, Acharya et al. (2014) reinforced this quality factor as an important asset 
owned by managers and to be considered by corporations arguing that when talent 
managers are a scarce resource, competition in order to attract these forces firms to pay 
higher compensation packages. Consequently, individual firm’s incentives towards 
good corporate governance are reduced and better managers end up in firms with 
weaker governance, while in the other hand, better governed firms are directed by 
lower-quality managers. By studying a sample of U.S. firms the authors proved that 
there is an inverse relationship between the CEO’s talent and the corporate governance, 
with better CEO’s working in firms with weak corporate governance practices. This 
conclusion sustains prior researches which argue that the quality factor present on the 
management team forces firms to pay higher compensations. As so, these studies can be 
summarised by affirming that the competition towards the market for managerial talent 
is responsible for the poor governance and entrenchment in corporations.  
Other authors concluded that the levels of remuneration are associated with the internal 
firm’s characteristics, such as the board size and board compositions (Menozzi et al., 
2011), as well as the firm’s size (Barontini and Bozzi, 2011).  
 
1.6. The Remuneration Committee 
In order to have specialized human resources, with the required know-how and adequate 
competences, at least bigger and listed companies may distribute the functions and 
responsibilities over different Committees. This was an available option which was not 
mandatory until 1977 in the United States. Historically, the only Committee required by 
the U.S, Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and by the New York Stock 
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Exchange (NYSE) was the Audit Committee for all the publicly listed firms in 1977. 
With the Sarbanes-Oxley Act issued in 2002 coming up on United States, some 
additional Committees were demanded, including a Remuneration Committee, a 
Governance Committee and at last, a Nomination Committee. Furthermore, this Act 
specified that all the Committees mentioned previously, including the Audit Committee, 
should be entirely composed by independent members. Nowadays, the formation of the 
Remuneration Committee is not considered as a requirement for the publically listed 
firms in Portugal and therefore, Portugal may be considered as a good example to 
investigate in what refers to this issue.  
Some authors (Anderson and Bizjak, 2000) argue that having specialized Committees 
inside corporations allow directors to focus on particular business issues. Arguably, the 
Remuneration Committee is considered one of the most important which can be found 
inside a corporation, as it benefits from the capacity to attract and retain top managers 
through the adequate incentives, in order to operate in accordance with the 
shareholder’s interests.  
In what refers to the specific case of the Remuneration Committee, its role is to design 
adequate compensation schemes, as a way to ensure that executive members are focused 
on achieving the long terms business goals, in alignment with shareholders’ interests. 
Apart from this, the committee may also elaborate recommendations regarding this 
topic to propose to the Board which may or may not decide to adopt these. For those 
firms which do not have a Remuneration Committee, this type of decisions should be 
taken by the Board of Directors.  
Regarding the Portuguese case in specific, the director’s remuneration should be 
defined by the Board or by the responsible committee, taking in consideration the 
functions developed and the economic situation in which the firm is inserted, possibly 
composed by a fixed and/or variable component (Art. 399º, nº 1 of CSC).  
Typically, we can identify members of the Board present on this Committee, having the 
belief that its independency principle is ensured. This topic is considered essential for 
the correct functioning of the Committee, aligning therefore the interests with 
shareholders.  
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In terms of the main role, the Remuneration Committee may have a dual role in the 
company: on one hand it can be perceived as an internal mechanism while on the other, 
it may be considered particularly important in preserving the shareholder’s interests 
(Murphy 1999; Anderson and Bizjak 2000; Hermalin and Weisbach 2003; Silva 2009). 
Apart from the remuneration packages, this Committee should asses the executive’s 
performance, elaborate reports to the Board, be present in particular meetings, among 
other recommendations elaborated by the CMVM, in the Portuguese case. For this 
reason, it is important that Compensation Committees are composed by independent 
directors, in order to ensure the effectiveness of their functions.  
Regarding this topic, there has been an emergent discussion also due to the latest 
scandals and collapses observed worldwide
6
, arguably connected with the lack 
of/improper structure of good corporate governance systems.  Following this trend, 
there has been a growing literature suggesting an ineffective job from the Board of 
Directors, in the absence of an adequate level of effective monitoring. 
In order to avoid these kinds of scandals, some authors/institutions have developed 
recommendations on the topic. For example, in Portugal the CMVM has introduced 
since 1999 several recommendations on the area, such as the one stating that listed 
companies must reveal the executive’s remuneration on their Annual Government 
Reports. Regarding the independence issue on the Remuneration Committee, CMVM 
advises that in order to ensure that managers and shareholder’s interests are aligned as 
much as possible, the Remuneration Committee should be solely composed by 
independent members, as also suggested by NACD. Furthermore, it recommends that 
the Board of Directors should have at least 25% of its members considered as 
independent, so that the non-executive directors may better develop their function of 
supervision and monitoring of the other members of the board. 
7
 
In fact, Williamson (1985) argues that in the case where an independent Remuneration 
Committee is absent, the company’s directors will have the possibility and perhaps the 
motivation to write and approve the remuneration contracts without any supervising 
constraints, illustrating why the Remuneration Committee is so important. Without this 
                                               
6
 For example, Enron, Tyco and  Bernard Madoff, in the United States, British Rail in the United 
Kingdom, Parmalat in Italy,  Vodafone Mannesmann in Germany and Vivendi Universal in France 
7
 These recommendations will be fully described on section 1.9.3. 
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body, the Board of Directors would be able to set the levels of compensation as desired, 
hypothetically not following the firm’s value maximization principle.  
 
1.7. The Ownership Structure 
In order to understand and to evaluate the impact and the effectiveness of Corporate 
Governance measures inside a corporation, it should be taken into consideration the 
firm’s ownership structure.  
In a first level of analysis, it is important to understand the structure of 
concentration/dispersion of the firm’s capital as this might have a direct effect on the 
firm’s executive functions. Thus, the director’s monitoring role may be compromised.  
According to Farinha and Costa (2009), the dispersion or in contrast, the concentration 
of the firm’s capital may produce contradictory effects in terms of the firm’s directors 
behaviour and their monitoring role. As earlier documented by Becht (1999), a 
concentrated ownership structure has the consequence of attributing to the majority 
shareholders voting power and incentives. Thereby, they may face the appropriate 
incentives and power to discipline managers. However, if in one hand we have an 
attractive and powerful disciplining tool due to a higher concentration level, we have 
also a potential conflict of interests arising between the majority and the minority 
shareholders, originating an agency problem.  
Nevertheless, there are alternative ways of encouraging managers to follow the firm’s 
value maximization principle, providing the alignment of interests. Following Jensen 
and Meckling’s (1976) perspective, in corporations characterized by a high dispersion 
of capital with a various shareholders, normally firms are directed by a manager or by a 
management team composed by several individuals. In these cases, managers with no 
ownership over the company may find it attractive to have a small percentage of the 
firm’s capital, contributing to the alignment of interests. However, it should be 
considered that managers with ownership may become a powerful entity inside a 
company, which can lead to the so called entrenchment problem (Farinha and Costa, 
2009). If in one hand this ownership structure may be considered an attractive corporate 
governance mechanism, on the other hand, it can lead to serious problems in the case of 
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incompetent or even self-interested managers. In these situations, if managers have a 
significant participation in the firm’s equity capital, it may be extremely hard to remove 
them from the management team. 
In summary, it is important to know the ownership structure of the company as well as 
the manager’s participation in order to find the adequate solutions for each individual 
case.  
It is worth to mention that according to these last authors, by studying a sample of 
Portuguese listed firms, they observed a significant influence of the firm’s ownership 
structure over the way that monitoring activities were exercised over managers. The 
authors suggest that for a certain level of concentration, the monitoring functions 
attributed to managers may be favoured, while on the other side, the existing 
blockholders
8
 may contribute by influencing the way that monitoring is exercised by 
those. Even though it may seem that the majority shareholders may have a stronger 
influencing power over the management, the institutional blockholders tend to have a 
stronger monitoring performance. Following Edman’s (2013) argument, blockholders 
may intensify the agency problems, rather than solve them as their presence may 
corrode managerial intervention or may lower liquidity. If blockholders may solve the 
agency problem present between managers and investors, in contrast, they exacerbate 
the conflicts of interests in between majority shareholders and minority shareholders. 
Furthermore, it is also considered the possibility of blockholders to have inadequate 
individual objectives which overlap the firm’s value maximization principle.  
 
1.8. The Corporate Governance Models 
The Corporate Governance mechanisms of decision-making and supervision, may vary 
from country to country, from organization to organization also due to the legal and 
institutional environment inside a company (Silva et al., 2006). As a result, it is 
plausible to sustain that the Corporate Governance models applied, differ influenced by 
their historical, social, cultural and economic path of the country. The existing models 
diverge from each other in what refers to the relative strength of influence exercised by 
the stakeholders and by the influence they produce over management.  
                                               
8
 A blockholder is an expression used to define large shareholders. 
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Essentially, we can find on the White Book (Silva et al., 2006) two models of Corporate 
Governance: the Anglo-Saxon Model and the Continental Model. The first model 
equally described as an external control system or as a control system by the market, is 
often found in countries such as the United States of America, United Kingdom as well 
as in other Anglo-Saxon countries. The Continental system is linked to an internal 
control system or a system based on relationships and can be found in Continental 
Europe and Japan.  
Briefly describing the models just mentioned, the Anglo-Saxon Model is characterised 
by a dispersed ownership, in a liquid and vast capital market which is consequently, 
connected with the Agency Theory, due to the observed difficulty in aligning managers 
and shareholder’s interests. For this reason, it is considered vital to protect the minority 
shareholders against the company’s managers, evidencing the importance of the control 
mechanisms inside a corporation. One strong feature associated to this model is the idea 
that efficient markets exist, having therefore a controlling action over managers, 
meaning that if it became public that the management team were acting solely according 
to their own interests, they will be considered and treated as incompetent and as 
despising the shareholder’s interests and the value maximization principle. The practical 
result would be a possible takeover and a substitution of the firm’s management team 
by another, more qualified one. Two additionally characteristics of the Anglo-Saxon 
model are related with manager’s compensation which are strongly defined in terms of a 
variable basis aiming at the alignment of interests and a thorough information disclosure 
to the capital markets. Finally, it is relevant to mention the structure of the Board of 
Directors followed under this system. Usually, we are able to distinguish the internal 
directors (also denominated as insiders) which are executives and have past experience 
in the corporation and the external directors (often called outsiders), commonly non-
executive directors with no internal relationships with the firm.  
The Continental Model is usually associated to a more concentrated ownership, where 
majority shareholders possess significant positions inside the corporation (e.g. families). 
Thereby, once the company is controlled internally, it is possible to face some particular 
agency problems arising from conflicts of interest between the majority and the 
minority shareholders. Takeovers are not so frequent and it is common for corporations 
to exhibit anti-takeover mechanisms (Silva et al., 2006). Contrary to the Anglo-Saxon 
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Model, this system exhibits a strong presence of a fixed component on the remuneration 
schemes and therefore, the alignment of interests between the shareholder’s and 
manager’s interests is considered to have a reduced importance.   
Besides these two models, Corporate Governance models also distinguish the structure 
of the Board of Directors. As so, it is possible to identify two distinct models: the 
dualist, found in countries like Austria, Germany and Switzerland and, the monist 
model identified in countries like Portugal. 
The Monist Model, or Tier 1, is characterized by the possibility of having or not the 
Executive Board incorporated inside the Board of Directors and therefore, in this case, 
the company would be led by one party only. Apart from that, the positions of CEO and 
Chairman may be assumed by distinct individuals.  
In the Dualist Model, also called Tier 2, it is possible to identify an intermediary 
structure between the General Meeting and the Executive Directors, having two parties 
the responsibility of running the company. The executive Board stands outside the 
Supervisory Board while the CEO and the Chairman are assumed by different people.   
 
1.9. The Portuguese Market  
1.9.1. Historical Context 
The Portuguese market for Corporate Governance which has been growing and 
developing in the last decades, is the aim of this work. 
In Portugal, some of the Corporate Governance principles are included on the legal code 
- “Código das Sociedades Comerciais” (CSC). Nevertheless, the transposition to the 
market is done through the CMVM. In this case, all the entities issuing shares that are 
willing to be traded on a regulated market, are subject to the duty of annually reporting 
the degree of compliance regarding the Code of Corporate Governance (Código de 
Governo das Sociedades). This code consists mainly on recommendations elaborated by 
the CMVM and follows the similar codes and practices observed over Europe.  
Succeeding the Directive 2006/46/CE of the European Parliament and Council, from 14 
June 2006, the recommendations contained in the codes of good corporate governance 
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are considered the basis for the annual reports on corporate governance, for the firms 
listed in regulated markets. As regards the degree of compliance, under the European 
Law, the corporate governance codes do not contain a public audit. In Portugal, CMVM 
has been taking care of examining the content of the corporate governance reports.  
In 1999, CMVM released the first set of 13 recommendations on this subject aimed at 
“Companies issuing shares admitted to trading on a regulated market and institutional 
investors”. On the following years, it has released several supplementary documents 
addressing the improvement and addition of relevant recommendations (2001, 2003, 
2005, 2007 and 2010) being that, in 2005 it mostly highlighted the Principles on 
Corporate Governance adopted by the OECD in 2004.  
Facing the clear necessity of data and measures on the topic and, following the 
important steps that were being taken all over Europe, in 2004 the IPCG was created, 
with the clear mission to issue the so called “White Book”, on Corporate Governance in 
Portugal. Later published in 2006, the “White Book” was developed with the intention 
of becoming a major code of Corporate Governance, primarily addressed to the listed 
firms. This initiative from IPCG was focused on contributing actively for the 
transparency, accuracy and modernization of the Portuguese Capital market. As a result, 
we can affirm that besides these recommendations there are a variety of measures and 
practices regarding Corporate Governance in Portugal, on both legal and regulatory 
standards.  
It is equally important to mention that based on the last economic and financial 
developments, the capital markets progress, the strong internationalization observed 
worldwide and due to the serious impact of information and communication 
technologies development, the Portuguese system relies not only on solid 
recommendations but also on legal frameworks (Silva et al. 2006). 
Currently, we can identify two main documents on which Corporate Governance is 
based on: the CMVM recommendations and the legal code – “Código das Sociedades 
Comerciais”. The CMVM recommendations have started earlier in 1999 as mentioned 
previously and have been constantly adapting and evolving with the new concepts 
towards the society demands. Along the years, the need for publishing the degree of 
compliance with the recommendations has been adopted and stronger requirements 
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were made, aiming to ensure that these were as timeless as possible and in accordance 
with the national and international concerns, as well as with the market and investors 
requests (Nogueira, 2011). Regarding the CSC, it has mainly focused the aspect of the 
director’s independence status of the listed firms, as mentioned by article 414º, nº 5 of 
CSC. 
 
1.9.2. Corporate Governance in the Portuguese Market 
The Board structure found in Portugal can be considered as very different from the ones 
observed in the United States of America but, closer to the board structures found in 
most of the European countries. 
The majority of the Portuguese Boards are organized in a single-tier structure, mostly in 
non-financial and reduced size corporations, even though the legislation contemplates 
both solutions. In this management structure it is possible to observe a division between 
the management and the strategic decisions which in practice, can be translated in a 
structure where the Executive Commission is part of the Board of Directors. As part of 
the single-tier system, we are able to identify the CEO, the executive directors and also 
non-executive directors in the same body without a Supervisory Board. The non-
executive’s prescribed role is to protect the shareholder’s interests, contributing to fill 
the informational gap existing between shareholders and managers (Fernandes, 2005).   
 
1.9.3. The Recommendations on Corporate Governance 
As previously mentioned, CMVM is one of the entities in Portugal which is responsible 
for developing measures and recommendations on good corporate governance practices. 
Thereby, on this next chapter we will mention the main and most important 
recommendations made to the Portuguese listed firms, according to their importance for 
the aim of this study. It is imperative to emphasize the fact that even though these 
recommendations are addressed to listed firms these are usually seen as being 
susceptible of adoption also by non-listed firms.  
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According to the last report issued by CMVM (2013), the recommendations can be 
categorized into six distinct groups: voting and control of the company; supervision, 
management and supervisory; remunerations; auditing; conflicts of interests and related 
party transactions.  
One of the measures that must be highlighted concerns to non-executive members. 
According to CMVM, the Board of Directors must include an effective number of non-
executive members which guarantees that they can perform their role of monitoring, 
supervision and evaluation of the other Board members (recommendation II.1.2.1.). 
Furthermore, out of these non-executives, the company should ensure an adequate 
number of independent members (recommendation II.1.2.2.), taking into consideration a 
number of specific aspects, such as the corporate governance model adopted, its 
dimension, the ownership structure and the associated free float.  
After analyzing our sample of 34 listed firms, our findings report that around 78% of 
the corporations studied accomplished with recommendation II.1.2.1. while only 30% 
followed recommendation II.1.2.2. Succeeding the report published by Universidade 
Católica Portuguesa (2013)
9
, 85.7% of all the listed companies in Portugal complied 
with recommendation II.1.2.1. and 38.1% with recommendation II.1.2.2, in 2012. The 
rate of compliance with this last recommendation reveals a low percentage which is 
even worse when compared with the statistics from 2011 and 2010 respectively: 40.5% 
and 47.6%.  
One of the most important recommendations relies on this topic – the independence of 
all the members that compose the Remuneration Committee (recommendation II.5.2.). 
Along our study we found evidence that out of the 34 firms analyzed 25 had a 
Remuneration Committee solely composed by independent members, representing 
around 74% of the corporations, while the report elaborated by Universidade Católica 
reports a percentage of 71.1% considering all the listed firms in Portugal. In addition, 
the CMVM strongly recommends that the remunerations of the Board and Supervisory 
Board members are published. This recommendation has a legal basis and it is 
expressed on the Law nº 28/2009 article 2, of 19th June 2013.  
                                               
9
 “Relatório Católica Lisbon/AEM – Governo das Sociedades em Portugal em 2012” 
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Concerning to the specific case on non-executive directors, it is recommended by 
CMVM that their remuneration should be solely based on a fixed component being that 
any variable component should be based on the firm performance or value. This 
recommendation, as earlier described, was also enunciated by the IPCG.  
Besides these two specific recommendations for which a particular importance was 
attributed given the aim of this study, also the remaining recommendations were 
analyzed. As so, it is possible to conclude that for the 34 corporations studied, around 
76% of the recommendations were “adopted”, 10% were considered as “not 
applicable”, 14% as “not adopted” and at last, 1% as “partially adopted”.  
Targeting to contribute to an increase on the percentage of compliance with its 
recommendations, CMVM adopted the principle of “complying or explaining” for the 
listed firms on the Portuguese stock market, a concept originated in Great Britain and 
currently applied over Europe. This principle relies on the obligation for the listed firms 
to inform CMVM about the recommendations being followed (according to the 
principle of “complying”), those not followed and the respective justification (according 
to the principle of “explaining”). This means that corporations must try to adopt the 
recommendations proposed as much as possible, as long as these are compatible with 
the firm’s objectives and characteristics. In addition, they should also report the 
recommendations not implemented with the necessary justifications.   
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2. Methodology, Data collection and descriptive statistics 
According to the European Transparency Directive, all the listed companies on the 
European regulated markets of NYSE Euronext and NYSE Alternext have the obligation 
to provide transparent information to the community and to investors, as well as the 
commitment to disclose the full information that may impact the securities market.  
In addition, the Portuguese stock market regulator (CMVM), through several 
recommendations which it has been introducing since 1999 obliges firms to disclose 
information such as the Annual Reports and on the Corporate Governance Reports. As a 
result, in order to ensure the credibility and reliability of the data collected, all the 
necessary information for this cross-sectional analysis was collected from the firm’s 
Financial Reports, Corporate Governance Reports, CMVM databases, among other 
sources, for a sample of Portuguese listed firms on the PSI Geral, for the year 2012.  
The study was elaborated based on 34 observations, corresponding to 34 different 
companies listed in the Portuguese stock market – PSI geral, for one year, excluding 
corporations from the banking sector. On appendix 1 it can be found a list with all the 
companies considered for this research (table 3). The original sample included 40 
companies however, due to the fact that during the year of 2012, 6 didn’t present non-
executive members, these were excluded for the purpose of this study
10
. Distinct data 
was collected in order to perform this study, both on corporate governance and firm’s 
results.  
A Board can be composed by executive and non-executive directors. Since our study 
will focus the non-executive’s topic, information regarding corporate governance 
concentrated mostly this specific aspect. The information collected also included data 
from the accounting and operational results which are able to produce influence over the 
non-executive’s remuneration schemes.    
In order to develop the proposed study, the methodology used was based on the 
Ordinary Least Squares (OLS). The regressions reported in section 3 include a set of 
variables which were tested as we believe that these might be able to have an impact on 
non-executive’s remuneration. On the next section we present a brief explanation of the 
                                               
10
 The six companies were: Sport Lisboa e Benfica, Compta, CTT, EDP, Estoril Sol and Teixeira Duarte. 
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independent and dependent variables used along this study as well as its calculation 
method/source of data, finalizing with the descriptive statistics. 
 
2.1. Independent variables 
Focusing on analysing which factors contribute for the non-executive’s remuneration, 
this study will give an emphasis to the level of independence of the members present on 
the Remuneration Committee, as well as to additional firm-related variables. On table 2, 
it is possible to observe the independent variables’ definition, its calculation as well as 
the expected outcome. The main studies performed so far on this area refer to the 
executive’s remuneration and therefore, some of the expected outcomes may be based 
on these studies, even though now we are trying to drive a different and mostly 
exploratory study relying on the non-executive’s directors. In fact, this lack of previous 
evidence is one of the main reasons that led us to develop this work.  
We will begin our study by defining the model presented below where we can observe 
some of the main independent variables.  
 
 
Equation 1: Initial regression with the independent variables 
 
According to the executive’s compensation literature (Murphy 1985; Jensen and 
Murphy 1990a; Kaplan 1994; Anderson and Bizjak 2000) a direct relationship between 
the firm performance and the directors’ remuneration must be encouraged as a way to 
reduce the agency problems and in order to contribute for the shareholder value 
maximization principle. On the non-executive’s literature, outside directors are seen as 
vital for the resolution of the agency problems between managers and shareholders 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983) likewise, they are primarily concerned with issues like the 
long term shareholder’s interest protection against short term self-interested executives 
(Mace 1971,; Long et al. 2005). Nonetheless, conclusions are still scarce regarding the 
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impact between pay and performance, specifically for the case of the non-executive 
directors. Core and Guay (2003) reported positive evidence between these, if options 
are used as a substitute for cash compensation. Contrary, Fernandes (2005) and 
Nascimento (2009) concluded for a weak pay-performance relationship. Aiming to 
understand deeply the impact of this variable on the compensation of the non-
executive’s directors, the first factor to take in consideration for this research is the firm 
performance. Even though there isn’t a single ideal measure of performance, two 
alternative variables will be considered: the average annual stock return variation 
(Kaplan 1994; Fernandes 2005; Nascimento 2009; Silva 2009) and the ROCE (Return 
on Capital Employed). The variable stock return (“Returns”) was included as it can be 
perceived as a proxy of the firm’s performance. For this purpose, we have collected 
information regarding the opening and closing values of the daily trading sessions along 
the year 2012 and the average annual stock return was calculated. This variable will be 
introduced with a logarithm (Log (Returnsi)) as a way to control for the firm’s 
performance. Since the non-executive’s main role is to monitor managers, 
independently from the firm’s performance, no relevant relation is expected to be found 
between these. In fact, the executive’s main function is to run the company towards 
good results. As so, it could be predictable that a positive relation could occur between 
these. In the specific case of the non-executive’s remuneration, their monitoring role 
should not be affected by the firm performance, as these are two separate areas, led by 
different agents.  
Nonetheless, this analysis may be distant from the reality. In fact, some studies reckon 
that 75% of the market’s movements (market capitalization) are not correlated to the 
company itself. Therefore, as this first analysis could be affected by the financial crisis 
having good and bad firms being affected, we will adopt a second perspective by 
studying the ROCE. This variable was calculated by dividing the Earnings Before 
Interests and Taxes (EBIT) by the sum of equity and net debt. For the two variables just 
described, we are not expecting a positive relationship between non-executive’s 
compensation and performance. If this happens, it could mean that non-executives could 
have a closer relationship to the shareholders and therefore, benefitting from the 
positive performance of the company and thus possibly not fulfilling their monitoring 
role with sufficient independence.  
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One of the most common empirical findings in the literature on directors’ remuneration 
was the strong and positive relation between the executive’s compensation and the 
company’s size. In fact, this conclusion was earlier made by Baker et al., (1988), 
Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009), in between other authors mentioned on table 
2. In order to have a complete understanding, the variable denominated “Assets” was 
included on the study representing a proxy of the firm’s size through the use of total 
assets along the year (Krivogorsky, 2006; Nascimento, 2009; Farinha and Costa, 2009). 
As an attempt to control for the firm’s size, we considered the Log (Assetsi) as 
previously tested by Nogueira (2011). By using this variable, a positive correlation is 
predicted with the non-executive’s compensation, related with the fact that bigger firms 
are typically more complex and, in principle, should demand not just higher-quality 
managers but also non-executive directors with stronger capacities of monitoring and 
therefore, with superior compensation. 
Later along this work, for robustness checking the variable “Assets” will be substituted 
by the “Sales”, which will be equally used as a proxy of the firm’s size and from where 
the similar results are expected (Brunello et. al 2001; Fernandes 2005; Nascimento 
2009). Accordingly, we should expect that the larger the firm, the higher will be the 
non-executive’s compensation.  
In addition, companies were categorized according to their size, following past studies 
from Conyon and Murphy (2000), Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009). This 
distinction arises from the problem earlier noted by Rosen (1992) and Holmström 
(1999) of how can we compare incentive schemes earned by top managers (more 
specifically, by the CEOs) from companies of dramatically different sizes? This 
question was also addressed by Baker and Hall (2004) who tried to incorporate the 
firm’s size in their model. For this study we followed the approach previously used by 
Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009) by distinguish firms according to their size, 
nevertheless by using a different measure. Companies were classified into “small”, 
“medium” and “large” according to their assets being that “large” firms retain the top 
20% while “small” firms the bottom 20%. Corporations which fall in between the 
percentiles of 20% and 80% of the total assets were considered to be “medium” size.  
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Besides the above mentioned variables, it is imperative to study the number of 
independent members of the Remuneration Committee. Daily et al. (1998), Anderson 
and Bizjak (2000) and Knyazeva (2011) previously noted that a relationship between 
the board independence and the CEO based pay is not statistically significant. Aiming 
to retain the effect of the Remuneration Committee composition on the non-executive’s 
compensation, we analysed the number of members on the Remuneration Committee as 
well as their independency status, or lack of it. This characteristic may have a direct 
impact on the company’s compensation scheme in general and, on the non-executive’s 
compensation in particular. The proportion of independent members on the 
Remuneration Committee was captured by the variable “Independent”, studied for the 
year 2012, for each company. As the Remuneration Committee includes a higher 
proportion of independent members, it is predicted that they would try to attract more 
qualified and experienced non-executive directors. Consequently, they will be available 
to expand the remunerations paid which can be translated into a positive impact over the 
non-executive’s total remuneration. In addition, as the proportion of independent 
members increases on the Remuneration Committee, it could be expected that the 
number of firms paying exclusively a fixed remuneration (as advised by the CMVM 
recommendations) would increase. This variable will have an additional role of 
understanding whether the CMVM recommendations were followed or not.  
In order to complement the research, two dummy variables were included as an attempt 
to capture unexplained variations across firms acting in different industries – 
“Multinational” and “Industry”. The dummy variable “Multinational” will assume the 
value of 1 if the firm belongs to a multinational group, or it will assume the value of 
zero, if not. In case a firm belongs to a multinational group, it could be expected that 
they would like to attract the better non-executive’s directors, with stronger 
competences and highly qualified. As a consequence, it could be anticipated a positive 
correlation between these two variables.  
Looking forward to understand if the sectorial specificities can also have impact on 
remuneration, information regarding the type of industry was considered and can be 
seen on Appendix 1 (table 10).  
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Following the approach previously used by Conyon and Murphy (2000), Fernandes 
(2005) and Nogueira (2011), firms were classified according to 6 sectorial groups 
(Construction, Industrial, Media/Communication, Sports, Utilities and Others) by using 
5 dummies. Even though this methodology was used in previous researches focusing the 
executive’s case, regarding our specific study the expected sign is ambiguous. 
As an attempt to capture the effect of the capital structure on the non-executive’s 
compensation, we also included the variable “Freefloat”. It will express the percentage 
of capital which is considered as freefloat
11
 and it is expected to produce a negative 
effect over the remuneration component. As earlier suggested by Jensen and Meckling 
(1976), the concentration of the firm's capital may induce to contradictory effects in 
what refers to the non-executive's main function - Monitor the management and 
consequently, on their remuneration. However, we believe that with a more 
concentrated ownership structure (consequently with a lower percentage of freefloat), 
there will be already a good monitoring function performed by managers meaning that 
the non-executive’s scrutiny will not be so important thus, having the effect of lowering 
their remuneration. In other words, a more concentrated ownership might bring less 
importance attached to the external monitoring and therefore, a negative impact on the 
non-executive’s remuneration is expected. A larger float may have a positive impact on 
the non-executive’s remuneration policy.  
The CMVM recommendations on Corporate Governance play an important role, 
especially on the listed firms. As so, information regarding the recommendations and its 
degree of compliance was collected. The recommendations which were “partially 
adopted” were considered as “not adopted” and, for the aim of this study, were 
considered exclusively the “adopted” recommendations. As so, the variable 
“Recommendations” incorporated the proportion of adopted over the total nº of 
recommendations. The expected outcome is negative as the higher is the proportion of 
adopted recommendations, the lower is the importance of the monitoring role developed 
by the non-executive directors on the Board, meaning a lower total remuneration. 
                                               
11
 Freefloat refers to the share capital that is admitted to trading on a regulated market, which is currently 
in circulation. In other words, it can be described as the proportion of share capital (out of the total nº of 
shares) which is willing to be traded on the secondary market.  
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To finalize this section, table 12 reports the correlation between the variables used along 
this study, excluding the dummy ones. As so, from the matrix we are able to conclude 
that the non-executive’s total remuneration seems to have a stronger correlation with 
two variables, which was already expected: the firm’s size (illustrated through the 
firm’s assets) and with the degree of compliance regarding the CMVM 
recommendations. The same appears to happen with the firm’s freefloat and, 
surprisingly, with the alternative variable used as a proxy of the firm’s performance – 
ROCE.  
 
2.2. Dependent Variables 
Following Kaplan (1994), Brunello et al. (2001), Stammerjohan (2004), Fernandes 
(2005) and Nascimento (2009) approaches
12
, we will consider as the dependent variable 
the Non-executives annual remuneration per capita, composed by the fixed and variable 
income, represented by Log (Payi). The reason for the log of this variable is to mitigate 
the differences in non-executive’s compensation across firms and therefore, contribute 
to reduce the heteroskedasticity. Even though it contrasts with the CMVM 
recommendations, the fact is that along the 34 corporations studied, 23.5% of those 
preferred to include a variable component on the non-executive’s remuneration. As a 
result, this variable must be included in order to better determine the results of this 
study. Stock options or other kind of benefits were not included as part of the variable 
compensation. This information does not require a public disclosure and therefore, it 
was not considered in the annual compensation figure.  
For this variable, the total remuneration of all the members was considered and 
consequently, the remuneration per capita was calculated.  
 
 
                                               
12
 The researches performed by these authors didn’t focus on the non-executive’s remuneration 
specifically, but on CEO’s or executive compensation schemes. Fernandes (2005) when studying the 
Board compensation analysed the specific case of the non-executive remuneration. Nonetheless, the 
approach of using the total remuneration per capita calculated through in logarithm terms follows their 
researches, as it seems to be an adequate perspective for our study. 
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2.3. Descriptive statistics  
The next section will describe the descriptive data on financial and governance 
characteristics, for the 34 firms listed on the Portuguese stock market, studied along this 
work. By studying the sample of companies (generally described in table 3), we were 
able to obtain the following results, which can be found at table 1. 
The majority of the listed companies present in the Lisbon stock market are considered 
to be small-medium size
13
. Representing 73.5% of the corporations, there are the small 
firms for which the characterization was based on the assets registered in the year 2012. 
The remaining 26.5% are distributed between medium and larger firms, as it is shown 
on table 4 (Panel A). As an attempt to characterize firms by using a different measure, 
these were also distributed according to the sales verified in 2012. As so, the 
conclusions are particularly similar with 82.4% of the corporations being small size, 
having the remaining 17.6% been distributed between medium and large size (table 4– 
panel B). Thereby, based on the sample being used, it is plausible to conclude that the 
majority of the listed firms on the Portuguese stock market (PSI Geral) are considered 
to be small size. 
According to our descriptive statistics, typically a Board is composed by approximately 
4 executive directors (represented by “Exec”), where the non-executive members 
(“NonExec”) hold around 55% of the Board seats. Looking closer into the data 
represented on table 5, out of the 9 (8.7 members) members which on average constitute 
the Board, around 2 (2.2) are considered to be non-executive independent (“NE_ind”), 
illustrating that the majority of the firms did accomplished with the recommendation 
II.1.2.2 proposed by the CMVM
14
. Recommendation II.1.2.1
15
 was also taken in 
consideration along this study presenting a result of 91% of accomplishment (table 3 
and table 6).  
Table 5 summarizes how do Board size varies across companies. Usually larger firms 
evidence a larger board, in both positions: executive and non-executive, as earlier 
                                               
13
 This conclusion holds analysing both Assets and Sales as the characteristic variable, for each firm, for 
2012.  
14
 Recommendation II.1.2.2. mentions that the non-executive members present on a firm’s board should 
include 25% of independent members. 
15
 Recommendation II.1.2.1. refers to the number of non-executive directors that must ensure an effective 
capacity of supervision. 
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illustrated by Fernandes (2005)
16
. Our results sustain the previous ones, with the Board 
size increasing with the firm’s dimension.  This conclusion holds when we distinguish 
the firm’s size based both on their assets and sales though it was interesting to observe 
that the number of executive members is higher for smaller firms, when compared to 
medium-sized corporations, using either assets or sales as a measure of size. 
Similarly, the Board structure presents distinct characteristics along our sample. There 
were six companies which were excluded from our initial model as their Board 
composed solely by executive directors (representing 15% of an initial sample 
composed by 40 companies). With the remaining 34 corporations that constitute our 
sample, 13 had zero non-executive members considered independent (representing 
38%). Regarding this specific topic, it is interesting to mention that three companies had 
their Board composed of at least, 80% of non-executive directors
17
, while 22 
companies, representing 65% of the entire sample, had their Board composed of 
between 50% and 79% of non-executive members (table 7). 
The maximum number registered for executive directors inside a Board was 7 members, 
while the maximum weight that non-executives represented on a Board was 87.5%.  
In addition to the table already presented earlier, table 8 reports the composition of the 
Remuneration Committee. For the year 2012, 5 corporations didn’t had any independent 
member, including the firm Sporting Clube de Portugal, which didn’t specified this 
information
18
. If we exclude this corporation from our sample, we can affirm that on 
average, firms have 3 members composing the Remuneration Committee, independently 
from their size, from which 86% are considered to be independent. According to the 
data collected, the Compensation Committee size ranges from zero to four members, 
being that the bigger the firm, the higher is the proportion of independent members 
composing the Remuneration Committee (table 8 – Panel B). The majority of our 
Committees, around 85%, evidence a size up to three members.  
                                               
16
 Fernandes (2005) characterized firm’s size according to their market capitalization. 
17
 These firms were Impresa, Media Capital and REN. 
18
 Sporting Clube de Portugal (SCP) didn’t specify the total number of members composing the 
Remuneration Committee as well as the number of independent members.  The information available 
mentioned that the Remuneration Committee was solely composed by “shareholders” however, further 
information was not available. Even though this company affirmed to have accomplished with the 
CMVM recommendation number II.5.2. (the members from the Remuneration Committee must be 
independent from the Board), since the members are shareholders, they will be considered as non-
independent for the purpose of this study.  
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For the remuneration analysis, it was considered solely the fixed and variable annual 
compensation from the non-executive members, expressed in euros. Out of the 34 firms 
composing the sample, 8 paid a variable component to the non-executive directors and 
26 had exclusively a fixed pay, representing around 76.5% of the sample (table 3). As 
regards to the total remuneration packages paid per capita during 2012, the average 
amount spent per non-executive director was 81,885.72 euros, with larger firms 
expressing a higher total compensation when compared to medium/smaller firms (table 
9 – panel C). This conclusion is also related with the fact that larger firms evidence a 
larger number of non-executive directors on their Board. On average, larger firms have 
around four times more non-executive members on their Board and the total 
remuneration of larger firms is around seven times more when compared to smaller 
firms. This evidence is also present when comparing larger and medium sized firms. 
Bigger firms have on average around 1.8 more non-executive members with the total 
compensation being around 2.9 higher. Though, in terms of total remuneration per 
capita, the larger firms appear to have higher compensations when compared to the 
remaining ones, if the size characterization is done on the basis of assets. Nevertheless, 
due the fact that only one firm was considered as “large” (based on its assets), the 
results might not be truly representative. In an attempt to be more conclusive, the size 
effect over non-executive’s pay was also considered by characterising firms according 
to their sales (Panel D). On this field, medium sized firms evidenced a higher 
compensation per capita, contradicting the previous conclusion. Interestingly, the 
smaller firms on average experienced a higher compensation per capita when directly 
compared to bigger firms. Table 9 (Panel A) reports the share between fixed and 
variable-based compensation as a percentage of the total compensation, illustrating that 
17% of the non-executive wages per capita represent a variable component. Also, 
bigger and smaller firms present the highest proportion of variable wages (representing 
24% and 19% respectively). These results are valid exclusively for a characterization of 
the firm’s size based on their assets. In case firms are distinguished according to their 
sales, medium sized firms evidence the highest proportion of variables wages (22%), 
where small and larger firms evidence a bigger fixed component, 86% and 94% 
respectively. 
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Just a quick reference regarding the remunerations earned per non-executive member 
with independence status (“NE_ind_pay”), where on average they achieved a lower 
remuneration of 33,689.29 euros, when compared to the non-independent members.  
Going further in this study, we are able to conclude that out of the 21 corporations 
which showed the presence of non-executive members with independent status, 5 did 
include a variable component on the remuneration package (around 24%). Extending 
this same analysis but including alternatively the firms with independent members on 
the Remuneration Committee, out of the 29 corporations studied 5 proved to include 
this variable element as part of the total compensation, which can be traduced into 
around 17% of the companies (table 9 – Panel B). 
Regarding the firm’s performance, our results overall indicate that the average annual 
variation of the stock returns was 0.19%, with the maximum result showing 9.45% and 
the minimum -3.7%.  
To explore further the importance that the firm’s capital structure might have on this 
topic, information was collected about the percentage of freefloat. Our results suggest 
that on average, the freefloat represents around 20% of the firm’s shareholder structure, 
where the maximum result observed was 47.3%.  
As part of our empirical study, an analysis was conducted by industry from where we 
conclude that the majority of the corporations work on the industrial sector (24%), close 
to what was previously reported by Nascimento (2009), followed by the utilities market 
(table 10). 
To conclude, it was explored the degree of compliance regarding the CMVM 
recommendations on Corporate Governance. On average, around 76% of the 
recommendations were considered as “adopted”, having the firm Sonae exhibited the 
highest percentage (95%) and Imobiliária Grão-Pará the lowest one (42%). Detailed 
information can be found on table 11. 
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3. Regression Analysis 
In this section we will study the determinants that might be valuable in order to try to 
explain the non-executive’s compensation schemes. We will introduce corporate 
governance variables as well as operating and accounting measures. Given the potential 
disciplinary role that the Remuneration Committee might have, we will investigate if its 
composition is able to influence the level of non-executive’s compensation. 
 
3.1. Performance, size and the Remuneration Committee Structure 
As earlier suggested by Stammerjohan (2004), presumably the better management 
decisions can be achieved by paying higher remunerations. As so, it should be expected 
that better performing firms should be associated with higher remuneration packages. In 
addition, defining compensation as a function of the firm’s performance may be seen as 
a way to align interests between managers and shareholders, contributing for the agency 
problem (Murphy 1985; Kaplan 1994). However, given the monitoring role usually 
allocated to non-executive directors, it is plausible that performance has no relation to 
non-executive’s compensation. 
The aim of this regression is to try to explain the total variation of the non-executive’s 
remuneration by including three explanatory variables which we believe are more 
important for this study. As a result, besides the firm performance, additional variables 
will be included in order to try to understand how non-executive’s pay varies across 
different sized companies and how might the Remuneration Committee structure affect 
the compensation schemes. 
 
 
 
Equation 2: Performance, size and the Remuneration Committee Structure 
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Where Returnsi is the annual stock return, Assetsi represent the assets expressed in euros 
as a proxy of the firm’s size and Independenti relates to the proportion of independent 
members on the Remuneration Committee, for company i. 
For the model presented above, we used an OLS model and the data from the 34 
corporations in our sample.  
Table 13 illustrates the results obtained with this specific equation. Our principal 
findings are in accordance with the previous researches of Stammerjohan (2004), 
Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009) and, in discordance from Yermack (2002), 
with the stock returns not being statistically relevant for the composition of the 
remuneration of each non-executive member. The coefficients on performance are 
always considered to be negatively insignificant when considering exclusively the fixed 
remuneration. When considering only the variable compensation, the estimated 
coefficient shows some significance even though it maintains a negative relationship. 
The p-value exhibited by the variable “returns” considering exclusively the variable pay 
is statistically significant at the level of 1% significance. In addition, it is important to 
highlight the fact that only 8 corporations paid variables salaries (around 24% of the 
sample).   
These results suggest that the non-executive’s total compensation schemes are not 
significantly related with the firm performance.  
In contrast, it can be noticed a size effect expressed through a positive and significant 
correlation between the non-executive’s remuneration and the firm’s size (represented 
through the firm’s assets). The significance of this variable holds when considering the 
total, fixed and variable remunerations, being statistically relevant at the 1% and 5% 
levels of significance. As so, there is sufficient evidence to state that the firm’s size is a 
significant influence on non-executive’s total, fixed or variable components of 
remuneration. This conclusion is in line with our expectations since the larger (and 
consequently, more complex) the firm, the higher was the probability of having greater 
compensation schemes. It is equally related with the possibility that such companies 
need better trained, competent and more experienced directors (Kostiuk 1989; Acharya 
et al. 2014). Earlier Fernandes (2005) had already documented this effect with bigger 
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firms seeking for more non-executive members, arguably to correspond to the 
regulators’ recommendations and in order to obtain additional visibility.  
Regarding the proportion of independent members on the Remuneration Committee, our 
results cannot reject the null hypothesis of no impact of this variable on non-executive 
compensation. 
To summarize, according to the sample analysed it can be concluded that the firm’s size 
is a statistically significant determinant of the non-executive’s total remuneration per 
capita. In contrast, the correlation between firm performance and non-executive 
compensation is not observed to be significant, with the exception of a significantly 
negative estimated coefficient when only the variable component of the remuneration is 
considered.  
As earlier documented by Anderson and Bizjak (2000), the level of independence of the 
Remuneration Committee does not have a significant impact when defining 
compensation plans, more specifically, the CEO compensation plans.  
For the purpose of this regression, we can still conclude for the absence of serial 
correlation as the Durbin-Watson test is close to 2 as well as the absence of 
heteroskedasticity (p-value of 0.06), when considering the non-executive’s total 
remuneration per capita. 
 
3.1.1. An alternative perspective for performance - ROCE 
On the previous section, the variable Return was used as a proxy of the firm’s 
performance. Nonetheless, an alternative perspective was taken in consideration by 
using the variable ROCE. As mentioned previously, the annual stock returns might not 
be considered the best proxy in order to illustrate the company’s performance as most of 
the times it does not reflect the company’s “real” performance.  
As so, the following regression was calculated: 
 
 
Equation 3: An alternative perspective for performance - ROCE. 
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Where ROCEi is the Return on Capital Employed of firm i, expressed in euros.  
In this case, it is important to note that the firm Sporting Clube de Portugal evidences 
an extremely high ROCE (over -90%) which might distort the real results. As so, this 
company will be excluded from this equation and will be considered as an outlier.  
By analysing the 33 observations we can conclude that the performance keeps 
evidencing a coefficient which is insignificantly different from zero, while the size 
effect maintains its statistical significance with a p-value of 0.042 (table 14). 
Consequently, we can conclude that, there is sufficient statistical evidence to conclude 
that the firm’s size is an individually significant determinant factor, for the non-
executive’s total remuneration per capita. Even though the proportion of independent 
members on the Remuneration Committee shows a high estimated coefficient, it is still 
not statistically significant (as also observed for the previous equation on section 3.1). 
 
3.1.2. The Independent Non-executive’s Remuneration 
On section 3.1, it was considered as the dependent variable, the non-executive’s total 
remuneration per capita. Nonetheless, we thought it would be interesting to test an 
additional regression including instead the remuneration of the non-executive directors, 
which were considered as independent, by using the variable “NE_ind_Pay”.  
 
 
Equation 4: The independent non-executive’s remuneration 
 
The major conclusion that can be documented refers to the firm’s size for which there is 
statistical evidence to conclude for its individual significance at 1%. This variable 
exhibited a positive and significant estimated coefficient with a p-value of 0.001. The 
firm performance proved to have a negative impact, contrary to the Remuneration 
Committees structure, even though both variables are not individually significance 
(table 15). 
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3.2. The industry effect 
Attempting to capture the industry effect, an additional variable was included on the 
next regression being expressed through a dummy variable denominated Industry. As 
so, this will try to incorporate other business factors which might help us to explain the 
non-executive’s remuneration. The regression used was as follows: 
 
 
Equation 5: The industry effect 
 
Where Industryi is a dummy variable assuming the value of 1 if firm i belongs to a 
certain industry, or 0 if it doesn’t. In fact, given the six industries already described 
earlier in this work, we will have 5 dummy variables (Construction, Industrial, Media, 
Sports and Utilities).  
Table 16 reports the estimates of Equation 5. Following the earlier results, the non-
executive’s total remuneration keeps demonstrating that it is not significantly affected 
by the firm performance, being individual significant only when considering exclusively 
the non-executive’s variable compensation (p-value of 0.000). 
It is worth to mention that controls by industry were performed and contrary to 
Fernandes (2005) and Nascimento (2009), the introduction of the different industrial 
sectors allowed us to conclude that, in general, the estimated coefficients for the 
sectorial dummies are statistically insignificant for the non-executive’s remuneration, 
with higher estimated coefficients. 
Interestingly, we have noticed that out of the 7 corporations which illustrate a variable 
component on the non-executive’s total compensation scheme, 4 of those belong to the 
industrial sector, illustrating a percentage over 57%.  
Similarly to results from the previous section, the non-executive’s total remuneration 
per capita is highly influenced by the firm’s size 19  but not by the proportion of 
                                               
19
 This conclusion holds when considering the total compensation as well as when considering 
exclusively the fixed and the variable compensation parts.  
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independent members on the Remuneration Committee. In fact, only firm size proved to 
be statistically significant, when considering either the total pay, fixed or the variable 
pay components. 
After analyzing regressions 2 and 5, the main idea that prevails is consistent with the 
fact that the non-executive’s remuneration varies more according to the firm size and 
not much according to anything else, including the firm’s performance. The presence of 
independent members on the Remuneration Committee also does not significantly 
influence the non-executive’s remuneration. 
In general terms, Equation 5 is globally significant with a p-value of 0.002, explaining 
58.5% of the variations around the non-executive’s remuneration average. 
 
3.3. The impact of the level of debt  
An alternative perspective was considered for the aim of this study. Working from the 
initial regression on section 3.1, we will now include an additional variable to analyze 
the potential impact provided by the level of debt. This variable was calculated by 
dividing the EBIT over the net debt and equity, observed in 2012.  
 
 
Equation 6: The impact of the level of debt. 
 
Where LevelDebti is the level of debt exhibited by firm i. 
The main conclusion that can be obtained from this regression is that the level of debt is 
statistically relevant for determining the non-executive’s remuneration per capita (p-
value of 0.06), reproducing a negative impact on the compensation packages.  
Nonetheless, this analysis was repeated excluding the outliers. There were particularly 
two companies which evidenced extremely high amounts for this indicator and 
therefore, the regression was tested again including only 32 observations
20
. However, 
                                               
20
 The company SAG GEST evidenced a level of debt of 12,157.8% and Soares da Costa 94.34%. 
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under these circumstances the level of debt was not proved to have a material impact on 
the non-executive’s total remuneration, evidencing a positive but insignificant estimated 
coefficient, with a p-value of 0.21 when considering the total remuneration (table 17 – 
panel B)
21
. This suggests that the former result is being driven by some outliers in the 
sample, cautioning thus against strong conclusions being made about the real impact of 
debt on non-executive compensation levels. 
 
3.4. The introduction of two additional variables: multinational 
status and ownership structure  
The compensation policies practised by corporations have been seriously debated over 
the last decades, attracting a considerable attention from the public, scholars and policy 
makers. The large remuneration packages which often add to millions of dollars/euros 
have raised some interestingly news deadlines attracting considerable attention from 
society as a whole.  
The analysis undertaken in this section will focus on the non-executive’s remuneration 
levels and will extend the previous analysis into several directions. We will start by 
including a new variable which can be used to help us to have some insights about other 
potential factors that can affect non-executive’s compensation. 
Fama (1980) earlier defined the function of the non-executive directors, mentioning that 
their role is to track and monitor managers acts inside the corporation, acting on behalf 
of the shareholder’s interests. They discipline themselves through the market 
mechanism, what contributes for the evaluation of their work and consequent 
performance. As so, the market acts determining the price of their services.  
One of the new variables to be incorporated on this regression is related to the 
possibility of having firms belonging to a multinational group or not. This effect will be 
incorporated by a dummy variable which will assume the value of 1 in case the firm 
belongs to a multinational or 0 if not (Brunello et al., 2001). Implicit is the idea that 
multinationals, given their larger pool of resources available, greater complexity and 
                                               
21
 This conclusion holds when considering exclusively the fixed and the variable remuneration per non-
executive director. 
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possibly a stronger concern for internal monitoring mechanisms, are able to attract 
better qualified directors which in turn may translate into higher average pay levels. 
Another variable which could be helpful in understanding which factors better 
contribute for the non-executive’s remuneration is the freefloat. Companies with more 
concentrated ownership (lower level of free float) might need less demanding 
monitoring activities from non-executive directors and as a result, lower levels of pay 
may be observed. Accordingly, two additional components were included on the model 
earlier studied on section 3.2. 
 
 
Equation 7: The introduction of two new variables 
 
Where Multinationali is a dummy variable illustrating whether or not company i 
belongs to a multinational group and Freefloati reports the percentage of freefloat found 
in each company. 
Table 18 presents the ordinary least squares regarding Equation 7. Our results again 
suggest that the non-executive’s total remuneration is not significantly affected by the 
proportion of independent members on the Remuneration Committee, similarly to what 
was observed in the previous models. Also in accordance with the previous conclusions 
reported along this study, the non-executive wages seems to be positively correlated 
with to firm’s size but not with performance. Our findings support a significantly strong 
impact coming from the multinational dummy variable, presenting a p-value of 0.085 
when considering the total remuneration per non-executive director. In other words, for 
a 10% level of significance, there is sufficient statistical evidence to conclude that the 
multinational factor is individually significant for determining the non-executive’s level 
of compensation. This conclusion also holds when considering exclusively the fixed 
remuneration per non-executive member (p-value of 0.08). 
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In what refers to the industry effect, our findings suggest that the media and industrial 
companies exhibit higher compensation schemes, in contrast with sports and utilities’ 
firms.  
Regarding the freefloat impact, the table also reports that there is no major impact from 
this variable on the non-executive’s total remuneration per capita. Actually, the 
estimated coefficient presents a weak positive value but which is not individually 
significant. 
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These conclusions are particularly important as this regression explains around 69% of 
the variations around the non-executive’s total remuneration per capita, being that it is 
considered globally significant at the 1% level of significance (F-statist. is equal to 
0.001). 
 
3.5. Alternative Perspectives 
Before finalizing our study, we found interesting to test the regression earlier presented 
by using two alternative specifications, which we believe could bring interesting 
insights. 
 
3.5.1. Analyzing firms with exclusively fixed-based 
remunerations 
This section explores the regression earlier presented on chapter 3.4 by studying 
exclusively the 26 firms which evidence a fixed-based pay only. We therefore excluded 
for this purpose 8 firm 23 which did include a variable compensation on the non-
executive’s wages.  
 
                                               
22
 We also ran this regression by adding 
the variable "Recommendations", defined as the percentage of compliance with 
CMVM's issued recommendations. The estimated coefficient for this variable, 
however, was not significantly different from zero. 
 
23
 The 8 firms were: Cimpor, Corticeira Amorim, Galp, Mota Engil, Novabase, Portucel, Portugal 
Telecom and Semapa. 
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Equation 8: Firms with exclusively fixed-based pay. 
 
Where FixPayi represents the total fixed remuneration per capita paid by firm i, in 2012 
expressed in euros. 
Table 19 reports that, with the exception of one of the sector dummies (sports), no 
significant impact is found from the explanatory variables under analysis, even though 
all the coefficients evidenced a positive sign. Given that the sample size has been 
substantially reduced, these results may be due to the small number of observations in 
this particular experiment.  
 
3.5.2. Presence of a Remuneration Committee exclusively 
composed by independent members 
Besides the already presented variables, we believed it would also be potentially 
interesting to introduce an additional component to the regression earlier estimated on 
section 3.4, for the 34 corporations studied. The aim would be to study the impact of 
having firms with a Remuneration Committee exclusively composed by independent 
members. As so, a dummy variable will be included denominated IndRemCommittee 
expressing the value of 1 if the Committee is composed by 100% by independent 
members, or 0 if not. 
The estimated regression will be based on the one presented by Equation 7, including a 
new variable denominated IndRemCommittee. 
 
 
Equation 9: Remuneration Committee exclusively composed by independent members 
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Table 20 provides the ordinary least squares regression for the equation presented 
above. Our principal findings suggest that having the Remuneration Committee 
exclusively composed by independent members has a positive impact over the non-
executive’s total remuneration per capita but which is not significant at conventional 
levels. On the other hand, the firm’s size keeps its positive and significant impact on 
non-executive fixed pay (but not on total or variable compensation). Similarly, the 
multinational factor maintained its positive estimated coefficient in the case of 
considering only the total pay, proving to be individual significant with a p-value of 
0.09. 
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This regression is considered to be globally significant for 1% level of significance and 
it explains around 70% of the non-executive’s remuneration movements around the 
average. 
 
3.5.3. Probability of having exclusively fixed remunerations for 
non-executives 
 As an additional regression, we explored the determinants of the probability that firms 
pay exclusively a fixed remuneration to their non-executive directors. As so, a Logit 
model was tested according to the following equation, being that the dependent variable 
is a dummy variable. 
As a consequence, we defined as a dummy the variable “Fix_Onlyi” assuming the value 
of 1 if the company i pays exclusively a fixed remuneration to the non-executive 
members, or 0 if not (which means that the company i includes also a variable 
component). 
More specifically, due to the higher and positive coefficients presented for the variables 
Assets and Multinational on earlier regressions and since these two revealed always to 
be significant, we thought it would be valuable to include specifically these two 
variables on the regression model. Nonetheless, in order to complete the test as much as 
possible, additional variables were incorporated. 
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 This variable was also individually significant when considering exclusively the fixed pay, at a 10% 
level of significance. 
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Equation 10: Probability of having exclusively fixed remunerations 
 
By analysing table 21, the results suggest a negative but statistically insignificant 
relation between the firm’s size and the probability that a firm has non-executive 
directors being paid solely on the basis of a fixed component. Other variables are also 
statistically insignificant, with the exception of performance (measured with returns) 
that now presents a positive impact on the level of non-.executive pay and also, the level 
of debt which has a negative impact on that probability. Consequently, we can conclude 
that the higher is a company’s level of debt, the lower is the probability of having non-
executive’s remunerations exclusively fixed. In what regards to the firm’s performance, 
an opposite relationship can be observed meaning that the better the firm performance, 
the higher is the probability of having exclusively fixed remunerations for the non-
executive directors. 
25
 
 
                                               
25
 Also for this regression it was tested the impact from the variable “Recommendations” over the 
probability of having the non-executive’s remuneration solely fixed-based. The estimated coefficient for 
this variable, however, was not significantly different from zero. 
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4. Conclusions 
The non-executive’s role inside a corporation is nowadays widely recognized by the 
society and scholars. They are considered to play a vital monitoring function inside 
corporations, evaluating the daily management and by having an active role on the 
Board. Acting as mediators on the relationship between management and shareholders 
and trying to fulfill the informational gap between the shareholders and executive 
managers, non-executive directors can contribute for the resolution of the agency 
problems. They act as independent members being even considered as “referees” of the 
executive’s actions. In fact, the financial crises verified worldwide on the last decade 
and the bankruptcy of well-known firms such as Enron and WorldCom, arguably due to 
bad management and corporate governance problems, called the attention to this 
important problematic and lead to crucial discussions on the business world.  
Given that the importance of these directors inside the Board has been broadly 
documented, our exploratory study sought to analyze which factors determine the non-
executive’s remuneration. As part of this study we have included mainly financial and 
accounting indicators, but also governance and ownership structure variables in order to 
help us explain as best as possible the level of non-executive’s compensation. 
By studying a sample of 34 non-financial corporations belonging to the Lisbon Stock 
Market (PSI Geral), for the year of 2012, we were able to observe that on average firms 
have more non-executive members on the Board, being the firms listed on the Lisbon 
stock exchange generally express small-medium sizes, considering the sample behind 
the study. 
The first conclusion that can be taken is related to the firm’s performance. Our main 
results suggest that the non-executive’s wages are not significantly determined by the 
firm performance, as earlier documented by Stammerjohan (2004), Fernandes (2005) 
and Nascimento (2009). In contrast, our main findings reveal a strong size effect. In 
other words, there is sufficient statistical evidence to affirm that the firm’s size does 
contribute for the determination of the non-executive total remuneration per capita. 
This conclusion is consistent with previous research (Kostiuk 1989; Fernandes 2005; 
Nascimento 2009; Acharya et al., 2014) and is also in agreement with the idea that the 
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bigger the company, the more qualified directors it demands with consequently higher 
salaries. According to our sample, larger firms presented higher remunerations for non-
executive members, with fixed wages representing around 80% of the total 
compensation, in a sample where small-medium sized firms are predominant.  
The non-executive’s compensation levels exhibited however a statistically insignificant 
relation with the proportion of independent members constituting the Remuneration 
Committee. For generally all the regressions earlier estimated, the coefficients obtained 
were always positive but not statistically significant at conventional levels. In a sample 
characterized by having Remuneration Committees composed by over 80% of 
independent members, we expected this variable to have a significant influence on non-
.executive pay, due to the importance of the Committee inside corporations and due to 
the role of independent members. However, we were not able to conclude that the 
Remuneration Committee structure played an important role in designing non-
executive’s compensation schemes. 
In order to expand our analysis by considering other additional potentially significant 
factors, a control by industry was performed. Nonetheless, the respective results didn’t 
had any relevant impact as the respective conclusions didn’t had any materially change 
regarding the previous outcomes. 
Also, as an attempt to capture the effect of having firm’s incorporated in a multinational 
group, some additional tests were performed. The main results sustain the idea that in 
case a corporation belongs to a multinational group, the non-executive’s total 
remuneration per capita is positively influenced by this, having this variable a 
significant individual impact. Also an ownership variable was also considered in the 
analysis, (the Freefloat) but it evidenced an insignificant impact on non-executive 
compensation. 
As so, our main results suggest that the relation between the firm’s performance and 
non-executive remuneration is insignificant for total and fixed pay, being only 
significant in the case of variable pay. The non-executive’s pay is however, strongly 
influenced by firm’s size. The multinational factor also presents a positive influence 
over the remunerations examined. In addition, we have also observed that the presence 
of Remuneration Committees that were entirely composed by independent members did 
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not affect the level of non-executive’s remuneration, which was still mostly driven by a 
size factor. Finally, we also reported some evidence that the probability of having non-
executive remunerations totally composed by a fixed amount is positively influenced by 
firm performance but not by firm size, multinational status or other factors. The 
probability of having exclusively fixed remunerations per capita, increases as the firm’s 
performance improves and, as the level of debt decreases. These were the main 
individual significant factors which reported an individual significance.  
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Appendix 1 - Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 – Descriptive Statistics 
The table below illustrates the main descriptive statistics for the variables considered for 
the aim of this study. The variable “Exec” stands for the number of executive members 
inside the Board, “NonExe” the proportion of non-executive directors on the Board and 
“NE_Ind” for the number of non-executive members considered as independent. In 
addition, “Independent” stands for the proportion of independent members constituting 
the Remuneration Committee, “Pay” the total remuneration per non-executive member 
in euros, “NE_Ind_pay” the total remuneration earned by the independent non-
executive members and “Recommendations” represents the degree of adopted 
recommendations on corporate governance proposed by CMVM. At last, “Returns” 
stands for the average annual stock return and “Freefloat”, represents the ownership 
structure, traducing the percentage of freefloat present in each corporation. 
 
 Mean  Median  Maximum  Minimum  Std. Dev.  Obs.
Assets 2.802.632.735 609.727.689 20.095.700.000 33.633.623 4.643.378.190
Sales 1.432.567.468 207.469.255 18.507.000.000 1.015.146 3.610.209.543
Exec 3,911 4,000 7,000 1,000 1,505
NonExec (NE) 0,553 0,578 0,875 0,200 0,179
NE_ind 2,235 2,000 7,000 0,000 2,244
Independent 0,814 1,000 1,000 0,000 0,359
Pay 81.885,72 50.719,69 378.202,30 0,000 91.013,39
NE_ind_pay 33.689,29 19.450,00 300.540,90 0,000 56.095,16
Recommendations 0,757 0,754 0,945 0,418 0,101
Returns (%) 0,187 0,040 9,450 -3,700 1,811
Freefloat (%) 19,186 18,650 47,290 0,000 13,579
34
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Table 2 - Control/Explanatory variables 
Control / 
Explanatory 
variables
Designation Calculation Previous studies
Expected 
Sign
Theoretical and Empirical Foundations
Stock returns Log(Returns) Average Annual Stock Returns
Core and Guay (2001)
Stammerjohan (2004)
Fernandes (2005) 
Nascimento (2009)
no impact
As earlier documented by other authors, the board compensation is not significantly 
related to firm performance. For the non-executive's total remuneration, it is 
expected no significant impact of firm performance on non-executive remuneration 
if such directors are expected to exercise mostly a monitoring function.
Return on Capital 
Emloyed
Log(ROCE)                 ROCE = no impact
Alternative perspective to the stock returns. No significant impact is expected in 
what regards to the non-executive's remuneration.
Assets Log(Assets) Financial Reports
Baker et al. (1988)
Kostiuk (1989)
Stammerjohan (2004)
Krivogorsky (2006)
Fernandes (2005)
Nascimento (2009)
+
A proxy to the firm's size. Controls the dimension of the company. Consistent with 
the idea that bigger firms are more complex and demand  more competent and 
experienced directors, either executives or non-executives. Thus, bigger firms may 
be  characterised by having more serious agency problems that may impact on 
higher remunerations for directors.
Proportion of 
independent directors 
on the Remuneration 
Committee
Independent
Daily et al.  (1998)
Anderson and Bizjak 
(2000) 
Knyazeva (2011)
+
No clear evidence demonstrated between the proportion of independent members 
of the Remuneration’s Committee and the CEO compensation. We expect that as 
Remuneration Committees want more qualified non-executive directors, they will be 
willing to pay more. As so, a positive correlation is expected.
Multinational 
corporations
Multinational
             1, if the company is a multinational
             0, if not.
Brunello et al. (2001) +
It is expected that the non-executive's compensation is higher when firm's belong to 
a multinational group.
Industry Industry
             1, if the company operates in industry i
             0, if not.
Fernandes (2005) 
Nascimento (2009)
Nogueira (2011)
+/-
Previous studies reported lacking significance of the firm's industrial sector over the 
executive's compensation. Regarding the non-executive's specific case, we will 
include this industry control (by including 5 dummy variables) in order to control for 
different sectorial groups. No specific outcome is expected from these. 
Ownership Structure 
(freefloat)
Ownership 
Structure
Financial Reports
Jensen and Meckling 
(1976)
-
A more concentrated ownership may bring  less importance attached to external 
monitoring and thus, a negative impact on non-executives' remuneration is 
expected. This means that a lower float should have a negative impact on non-
executives' remuneration.
CMVM 
recommendations
Recommend
ations
Corporate Governance Reports -
In companies where the degree of compliance regarding the CMVM 
recommendations is significantly high, it could be expected that the non-executive's 
monitoring role is less important meaning that their remunerations can be lower.
An alternative measure used as proxy of the firm's size. For non-executive's, a 
higher remuneration is expected from larger firms. 
Sales Log(Sales) Financial Reports
Silva (2009)
Brunello (2001)
+
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Table 3 - Listed firms studied 
This table illustrates all the 34 firms studied along this work, for the year 2012. In addition, it aggregates additional information from each 
company, such as if it is a multinational or not (represented by the black dot if yes, or blank if no), if its Board is composed by executive 
and/or non-executive members and if it contains a Remuneration Committee. In addition, it also reflects if the corporation has 
accomplished with recommendations II.1.2.1 and II.1.2.2. and if the non-executive directors have received a fixed and/or variable pay. 
 
  
Name Multinational Executive Non-Executive 
Remuneration 
Committee 
Recommendation 
II.1.2.1. 
Recommendation 
II.1.2.2. 
Fixed 
Rem. 
Variable 
Rem. 
1 Altri ● ● ● ●     ●   
2 Brisa ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
3 Cimpor ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
4 Cofina ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
5 Corticeira Amorim ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
6 EDPR ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
7 FCP   ● ● ●         
8 Galp ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
9 Glintt ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
10 Ibersol ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
11 Imobiliária Grão-Pará   ● ●   ●       
12 Impresa   ● ● ● ● ● ●   
13 Inapa ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
14 Jerónimo Martins ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
15 Lisgrafica   ● ● ● ●   ●   
16 Martifer ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
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17 Media Capital ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
18 Mota Engil ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
19 Novabase ● ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
20 Orey Antunes ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
21 Portucel   ● ● ● ●   ● ● 
22 PT ● ● ● ● ●   ● ●  
23 Ramada   ● ● ● ●   ●   
24 Reditus ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
25 REN ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
26 SAG GEST ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
27 Semapa ● ● ● ● ● ● ● ● 
28 Soares da Costa ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
29 Sonae ● ● ● ● ● ● ●   
30 Sporting   ● ●   ●       
31 SumolCompal ● ● ● ● ●   ●   
32 Toyota Caetano   ● ● ●         
33 Vista alegre   ● ● ● ●   ●   
34 ZON   ● ● ● ● ● ●   
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Table 4 - Descriptive statistics in terms of firm’s size 
The 34 firms analysed along this work were categorized in terms of their size. As a 
result, firms were classified as “small”, “medium” or “large” depending on the criteria 
used.  This analysis was initially made by taking in consideration the firm’s total assets 
(in euros) and secondly, recurring to the firms total sales (in euros), as an alternative 
perspective. Panels A and B illustrate the number of firms per characterization, 
following the different approaches used. 
 
Panel A - Illustrates the number of “small”, “medium” and “large” firms, based on their 
assets verified in 2012. 
 
  Nº observations % 
Large 1 2,94% 
Medium 8 23,53% 
Small 25 73,53% 
Total 34 100% 
 
 
Panel B - Illustrates the number of “small”, “medium” and “large” firms, based on their 
sales verified in 2012. 
 
  Nº observations % 
Large 1 2,94% 
Medium 5 14,71% 
Small 28 82,35% 
Total 34 100% 
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Panel C - Specifies the firms and their category (“small”, “medium” or “large”), based 
on their assets (expressed in euros). 
 
Firm Assets (€) Size Nº Observations 
PT 20.095.700.000 Large 1 
Galp 13.908.574.000 
Medium 8 
EDPR 13.301.973.000 
Cimpor 7.089.500.000 
Sonae 6.035.355.458 
Brisa 4.922.500.000 
Jerónimo Martins 4.892.973.000 
REN 4.686.054.000 
Semapa 4.227.960.142 
Mota Engil 3.598.748.533 
Small 25 
Portucel 2.724.500.000 
Soares da Costa 1.792.000.000 
ZON 1.611.000.000 
Martifer 1.037.833.335 
SAG GEST 814.050.869 
Inapa 677.239.000 
Corticeira Amorim 643.767.000 
SumolCompal 575.688.378 
Media Capital 351.281.843 
Ibersol 223.982.513 
Novabase 218.956.000 
Glintt 216.564.956 
FCP 215.068.000 
Toyota Caetano 193.105.879 
Reditus 185.156.600 
Impresa 175.015.239 
Ramada 167.630.286 
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Cofina 142.416.968 
Sporting 139.464.000 
Vista alegre 130.435.000 
Altri 112.836.000 
Orey Antunes 86.789.175 
Imobiliária Grão-Pará 61.760.201 
Lisgrafica 33.633.623 
 
 
Panel D - Specifies the firms and their category (“small”, “medium” or “large”), based 
on their sales (expressed in euros). 
 
Firm Sales (€) Size Nº Observations 
Galp 18.507.000.000 Large 1 
Jerónimo Martins 10.876.000.000 
Medium 5 
Sonae 4.552.547.876 
Mota Engil 2.243.167.000 
Semapa 1.952.600.000 
Cimpor 1.510.000.000 
Portucel 1.501.600.000 
Small 28 
EDPR 1.160.182.000 
Inapa 926.700.000 
ZON 852.086.000 
Soares da Costa 801.848.536 
REN 588.973.000 
Corticeira Amorim 534.240.000 
Altri 522.314.000 
Martifer 481.391.925 
SumolCompal 295.700.000 
Toyota Caetano 216.271.646 
PT 198.666.864 
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Ibersol 171.310.000 
Media Capital 133.190.000 
Orey Antunes 120.030.991 
Ramada 109.336.000 
Glintt 91.123.513 
Novabase 74.280.000 
Cofina 60.076.304 
FCP 56.937.723 
Vista alegre 54.236.000 
Impresa 34.097.865 
Sporting 27.722.000 
Lisgrafica 22.455.000 
Brisa 14.286.000 
Reditus 14.241.537 
Imobiliária Grão-Pará 1.666.978 
SAG GEST 1.015.146 
 
 
Table 5 - Board’s composition 
The following tables will describe in detail the Board’s composition of the 34 firm’s 
studied.  
 
Panel A - Illustrates the average Board size (specifying the number of executive and 
non-executive directors on the Board), considering the 34 corporations studied for 2012. 
The first row refers to the number of directors, while the second reflects the proportion 
regarding the Board size. The last column (Board size) is the sum of executive and non-
executive members inside the Board.  
 
  
Nº 
observations 
Executive Non-executive 
Independent non-
executive 
Board size 
Nº 34 3,9 4,8 2,2 8,7 
%   45% 55%   100% 
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Panel B - This table represents the weight that the non-executive members considered 
as independent have, both on the total number of non-executive directors (1) and on the 
total number of members that constitute the Board (2).  
 
  Independent non-executive Non-executive members Total Board 
Nº 2,2 4,8 8,7 
%   
45,80% 25,30% 
(1) (2) 
 
 
Panel C - Specifies the average number of executive, non-executive and independent 
non-executive members that constitute the Board. The first column illustrates the 
number of firms considered as “large”, “medium” or “small”, while the last one, “board 
size”, illustrates the average Board size according to the firm’s dimension. The results 
below hold for firms which size was characterized based on their assets. 
 
  
Nº 
observations 
Executive 
Non-
executive 
Independent non-
executive 
Board 
size 
Large 1 7,0 17,0 7,0 24,0 
Medium 8 4,5 9,5 4,5 14,0 
Small 25 5,1 4,4 1,3 9,6 
Total 34 16,6 30,9 12,8 47,6 
  
 
Panel D - This table reports the same kind of information as Panel C (presented above). 
In this case, the results below hold for firms which size was characterized based on their 
sales. 
 
  
Nº 
observations 
Executive 
Non-
executive 
Independent non-
executive 
Board 
size 
Large 1 7,0 14,0 7,0 21,0 
Medium 5 4,4 8,2 3,8 12,6 
Small 28 5,1 5,3 1,8 10,4 
Total 34 16,5 27,5 12,6 44,0 
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Table 6 - CMVM recommendations 
Recommendations II.1.2.1 and II.1.2.2. were analysed for each single firm. Below we 
can find a summary of the firm’s which did accomplish with these recommendations (in 
absolute and percentage terms).  
 
Reccomendation % of firms Applying the recommendation Nº observations 
II.1.2.1. 91% 31 
II.1.2.2. 35% 12 
 
 
Table 7 - Non-executive members present on the Board  
Describes in detail the corporations and the respective proportion of non-executive 
members on the Board (columns 1 and 2). The last column refers to the percentage of 
firms with more than 80% of non-executive members constituting the board, between 
50% and 79% and, at last less than 50%. 
 
Firm Non Exec on board  Nº observations % 
Impresa 87,5% 
3 9% REN 80,0% 
Media Capital 80,0% 
ZON 76,5% 
22 65% 
Cimpor 73,3% 
Jerónimo Martins 72,7% 
PT 70,8% 
Reditus 70,0% 
Sonae 70,0% 
Martifer 66,7% 
Galp 66,7% 
Cofina 66,7% 
EDPR 64,3% 
Brisa 64,3% 
Orey Antunes 62,5% 
Soares da Costa 60,0% 
Mota Engil 60,0% 
Glintt 55,6% 
Portucel 54,5% 
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Novabase 53,8% 
SumolCompal 50,0% 
Corticeira Amorim 50,0% 
Inapa 50,0% 
SAG GEST 50,0% 
Semapa 50,0% 
Sporting 40,0% 
9 26% 
Toyota Caetano 37,5% 
Vista alegre 33,3% 
Ibersol 33,3% 
Imobiliária Grão-Pará 33,3% 
Ramada 33,3% 
Lisgrafica 25,0% 
Altri 20,0% 
FCP 20,0% 
 
 
Table 8 - The Remuneration Committee structure  
The panels below specify the characteristics of the Remuneration Committee as a whole 
(Panel A) and, specifying according to the firm’s size (Panel B). 
 
Panel A - Reports the average number of members (1) composing the Remuneration 
Committee, excluding the company Sporting Clube de Portugal¸ for the reasons already 
mentioned earlier in this work. This table also reports the number (2) as well as the 
proportion of independent members over the Committee total size (3).  
 
  Total Nº independent members % independent members 
2012 
2,91 2,51 86% 
(1) (2) (3) 
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Panel B - Summarizes the average number of members that constitute the 
Remuneration Committee, based on the firm’s size. In this case, the firm’s size was 
characterized based on the assets verified in 2012. For this purpose, the firm Sporting 
Clube de Portugal was considered as small firm but due to lack of data, it was excluded 
from these statistics.  
 
  Total % independent members 
Large 3,00 100% 
Medium 3,00 83% 
Small 2,88 83% 
 
 
Table 9 - The Non-Executive’s Remuneration 
The table illustrated below represents a summary of the descriptive statistics in what 
refers to the non-executive’s remuneration policy. Panel A contains the total 
compensation expressed in euros, including the remuneration per capita. Panel B reports 
the remuneration per capita, according to the firm’s size (earlier calculated based on 
their assets). 
 
Panel A - Annual compensation of the Non-executive directors, expressed in euros. 
Columns (2) and (4) represent the weight that both fixed and variable wages 
respectively, have on the total remuneration packages (5). Columns (1) and (2) express 
the amounts in euros. 
 
  
Fixed % Variable % Total 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Total 16.252.347,50 82% 3.497.169,94 18% 19.749.517,44 
Per Capita 67.803,40 83% 14.120,16 17% 81.923,56 
 
 
Panel B - Reports the kind of firms which included a variable component on the annual 
compensation schemes. Specifically, it traduces the firms with non-executive members 
considered as independent as well as the firms with their Remuneration Committee 
composed, partially or totally, by independent members (column 1). Column 2 indicates 
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the firms with independent non-executive directors and with independent members on 
the Remuneration Committee, which include a variable component on their 
compensation schemes. Column 3 illustrates a percentage of firms including variables 
wages (2) over the nº of observations (1). Column 5 incorporates the firms paying 
variable pays (2) over the total number of observations (4) composing our sample. 
 
 
Nº of 
observations 
Nº of firms 
paying variable 
component 
% 
Total Nº 
observations 
% 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Firms with independent 
non-executive members 
21 5 24% 34 15% 
Remuneration 
Committee with 
independent members 
29 5 17% 34 15% 
 
 
Panel C - Annual compensation of the Non-executive directors, expressed in euros, 
according to the firm’s size (based on their assets). Columns 1, 3, 5, 7, 9 and 10 
represent the amounts expressed in euros. Columns 2 and 6 represent the proportion of 
fixed and variable remuneration (respectively) over the total remuneration (9). While 
columns 4 and 8 associated to the fixed and variable remuneration per capita 
(respectively) illustrate the respective proportions over the total remuneration per capita 
(10). 
 
€ % € % € % € %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large 2.048.676 76% 120.510 76% 652.500 24% 38.382 24% 2.701.176 158.893
Medium 812.389 86% 94.620 81% 134.908 14% 21.598 19% 947.297 116.218
Small 308.182 81% 57.114 84% 70.616 19% 10.757 16% 378.799 67.871
Total Total/capita
Fixed Fixed/capita Variable Variable/capita
 
 
 
 
 
90 
 
Panel D - Annual compensation of the Non-executive directors, expressed in euros, 
according to the firm’s size (based on their sales).  
 
€ % € % € % € %
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10)
Large 510.808 94% 36.486 94% 31.518 6% 2.251 6% 542.326 38.738
Medium 1.109.627 78% 136.062 75% 311.327 22% 45.415 25% 1.420.954 181.477
Small 364.050 84% 56.733 86% 68.179 16% 8.956 14% 432.229 65.688
Total/capita
Fixed Fixed/capita Variable Variable/capita
Total
 
 
Table 10 - Descriptive statistics concerning the type of industry 
The following tables present a summary of the sectorial groups analysed, including the 
number of observations and its representation in percentage terms.  
 
Panel A - Descriptive statistics in terms of industry 
Firms were categorized into 6 different groups, fully described below.  
 
Sectorial Group Nº of firms % 
Others 12 35,3% 
Industrial 8 23,5% 
Utilities 5 14,7% 
Media/communication 4 11,8% 
Construction 3 8,8% 
Sports 2 5,9% 
Total  34 100% 
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Panel B - Firm’s characterization according to their sectorial group. 
This table fully describes the firm’s composing our sample, as well as the kind of 
industry where they are inserted. 
 
Construction Industrial
Media/
communication
Sports Utilities Others
Martifer Altri Cofina SCP Brisa Glintt
Mota Engil Cimpor Impresa FCP EDPR Ibersol
Soares da Costa Corticeira Amorim Media Capital GALP Imobiliária Grão-Pará
Inapa ZON PT Lisgráfica
Jerónimo Martins REN Novabase
Portucel Orey Antunes
Ramada Reditus
Semapa SAG Gest
Sonae
SumolCompal
Toyota Caetano
Vista Alegre
Nº of 
companies
3 8 4 2 5 12 34
% 9% 24% 12% 6% 15% 35% 100%
Sectorial Groups
C
o
m
p
a
n
y
Total
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Table 11 – CMVM recommendations: degree of compliance 
Out of the 55 recommendations, column (1) reports the number of recommendations 
“adopted”, column (2) reports the ones considered as “not applicable” (N/A) and 
column (3) the “not adopted”. Columns 4 to 6 represent the proportion regarding the 
total number of recommendations. 
Firm 
Adopted N/A 
Not 
adopted 
Adopted 
(%) 
N/A 
(%) 
Not adopted 
(%) 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Altri 39 6 10 71% 11% 18% 
Brisa 43 8 4 78% 15% 7% 
Cimpor 46 6 3 84% 11% 5% 
Cofina 37 6 12 67% 11% 22% 
Corticeira Amorim 38 4 13 69% 7% 24% 
EDPR 48 3 4 87% 5% 7% 
FCP 36 5 14 65% 9% 25% 
Galp 49 3 3 89% 5% 5% 
Glintt 36 2 20 65% 4% 36% 
Ibersol 45 2 8 82% 4% 15% 
Imobiliária Grão-Pará 23 16 16 42% 29% 29% 
Impresa 45 7 3 82% 13% 5% 
Inapa 47 4 5 85% 7% 9% 
Jerónimo Martins 45 5 5 82% 9% 9% 
Lisgrafica 35 12 10 64% 22% 18% 
Martifer 46 3 6 84% 5% 11% 
Media Capital 42 6 7 76% 11% 13% 
Mota Engil 37 7 11 67% 13% 20% 
Novabase 40 7 9 73% 13% 16% 
Orey Antunes 44 6 5 80% 11% 9% 
Portucel 46 4 5 84% 7% 9% 
PT 41 6 9 75% 11% 16% 
Ramada 38 6 11 69% 11% 20% 
Reditus 41 8 6 75% 15% 11% 
REN 47 5 3 85% 9% 5% 
SAG GEST 39 6 10 71% 11% 18% 
Semapa 44 7 4 80% 13% 7% 
Soares da Costa 46 5 4 84% 9% 7% 
Sonae 52 2 1 95% 4% 2% 
Sporting 39 7 9 71% 13% 16% 
SumolCompal 40 5 11 73% 9% 20% 
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Toyota Caetano 38 2 15 69% 4% 27% 
Vista alegre 36 6 14 65% 11% 25% 
ZON 48 6 1 87% 11% 2% 
 
Table 12 – Correlation Matrix 
 
Feefloat Independent Leveldebt
Log 
(Assets)
Log (Pay)
Log 
(Returns)
Log (ROCE) Recommendations
Feefloat 1 0,198 0,013 0,344 0,329 -0,043 0,250 0,228
Independent 0,198 1 -0,091 0,119 0,317 0,020 0,404 0,330
Leveldebt 0,013 -0,091 1 -0,008 -0,084 -0,037 -0,020 0,089
Log (Assets) 0,344 0,119 -0,008 1 0,392 -0,259 0,164 0,639
Log (Pay) 0,329 0,317 -0,084 0,392 1 -0,117 0,473 0,499
Log (Returns) -0,043 0,020 -0,037 -0,259 -0,117 1 -0,037 0,026
Log (ROCE) 0,250 0,404 -0,020 0,164 0,473 -0,037 1 0,077
Recommendations 0,228 0,330 0,089 0,639 0,499 0,026 0,077 1  
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Appendix 2 – Results from the estimated regressions 
Generally, all the estimated regressions were tested in three different ways: the first 
including the total remuneration per capita (Total Pay), the second including 
exclusively the fixed remuneration per capita (Fixed Pay) and at last, considering only 
the variable component per capita (Variable Pay). As so, along the next tables it will be 
possible to observe values for these three tests, using different dependent variables.  
For all the regressions tests, the respective tables will incorporate the correspondent 
estimated coefficient (defined as “coef.”) and the p-value. For this last one, it is possible 
to observe an additional symbol: * means significant at 1%, ** significant at 5% and 
*** significant at 10%. 
 
Table 13 – Performance, size and the Remuneration Committee Structure  
Reports the results from the regression estimated on section 3.1. The first column 
contains the independent variables earlier described in this work: returns, assets and the 
proportion of independent members on the Remuneration Committee (defined as 
“Indep.”).  
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. -0,122 -0,130 -1,357 
P-value 0,653 0,631 0,001 * 
Assets 
Coef. 1,617 1,877 2,128 
P-value 0,022 ** 0,007 * 0,022 ** 
Indep. 
Coef. 6,260 6,441 -3,109 
P-value 0,211 0,171 0,393 
Constant 
Coef. -30,000 -33,917 -46,150 
P-value 0,059 *** 0,027 ** 0,014 ** 
F-statist.   0,048 ** 0,018 ** 0,07 *** 
R²   0,229 0,280 0,325 
Nº Obser.   34 34 34 
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Table 14 - An alternative perspective for performance - ROCE  
This table shows as an alternative to the equation earlier estimated on section 3.1, 
introducing the variable ROCE as a proxy for the firm’s performance. 
 
  ROCE Assets Indep. Constant F-statist. R² Nº Obser. 
Coef. -0,187 1,603 4,357 -28,237 
0,176 0,154 33 
P-value 0,932 0,042 ** 0,376 0,099 
 
Table 15 – The Independent Non-executive’s Remuneration 
Reports to the regression estimated on section 3.1.2. where the dependent variable is the 
remuneration earned per non-executive director, considered as independent.  
R² Nº Obser.
Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value Coef. P-value
Total Pay -0,366 0,117 2,962 0,001 * 2,248 0,627 -60,449 0,001 * 0,260 34
Returns Assets Indep. Constant
 
 
Table 16 – The industry effect 
Reports the results from the regression estimated on section 3.2. The first column 
contains the independent variables earlier described in this work: returns, assets and the 
proportion of independent members on the Remuneration Committee (Indep.). The 
results associated to the dummy variables were not included, however, it should be 
noticed that a control by industry was performed.  
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. 0.017 -0,007 -1,674 
P-value 0,967 0,986 0,000 * 
Assets 
Coef. 1,144 1,467 1,762 
P-value 0,094 *** 0,027 ** 0,089 *** 
Indep. 
Coef. 3,882 4,023 -2,22 
P-value 0,404 0,352 0,536 
Constant 
Coef. -18,65 -23,795 -39,717 
P-value 0,281 0,149 0,062 *** 
F-statist.   0,002 * 0,000 * 0,056 *** 
R²   0,585 0,614 0,421 
Nº Obser.   34 34 34 
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Table 17 – The impact of the Level of Debt 
 
Panel A – Evidences the estimated results considering the Equation 6, for the 34 listed 
companies composing our sample, where LevelDebt represents the level of debt 
exhibited per company. 
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. -0,130 -0,137 -1,345 
P-value 0,633 0,613 0,000 * 
Assets 
Coef. 1,615 1,875 2,130 
P-value 0,025 ** 0,008 * 0,024 ** 
Indep. 
Coef. 6,143 6,332 -2,926 
P-value 0,230 0,188 0,433 
Level Debt 
Coef. -0,0002 -0,0002 0,0004 
P-value 0,055 *** 0,069 *** 0,024 ** 
Constant 
Coef. -29,941 -33,862 -46,242 
P-value 0,06 *** 0,030 ** 0,016 ** 
F-statist.   0,095 *** 0,041 ** 0,017 ** 
R²   0,231 0,283 0,331 
Nº Obser.   34 34 34 
 
 
Panel B – The same regression was estimated, including exclusively 32 observations, in 
order to exclude the outliers. 
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. -0,244 -0,223 -1,290 
P-value 0,317 0,316 0,000 * 
Assets 
Coef. 1,047 0,933 2,249 
P-value 0,060 *** 0,064 *** 0,028 ** 
Indep. 
Coef. 5,980 5,367 -3,335 
P-value 0,196 0,198 0,369 
Level Debt 
Coef. 0,164 0,150 0,000 
P-value 0,212 0,208 0,998 
Constant 
Coef. -18,350 -15,323 -48,201 
P-value 0,145 0,177 0,021 ** 
F-statist.   0,027** 0,027** 0,022 ** 
R²   0,325 0,324 0,336 
Nº Obser.   32 32 32 
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Table 18 - The impact of the multinational status and ownership structure 
Illustrates the results obtained from Equation 7. The first column contains the 
independent variables earlier described in this work: returns, assets, the proportion of 
independent members on the Remuneration Committee (Indep.), the ownership 
structure variable (freefloat) and an additional dummy variable illustrating whether or 
not a firm belongs to a multinational group (multinational). Controls by industry were 
also performed. 
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. -0,006 -0,022 -1,676 
P-value 0,985 0,949 0,000 * 
Assets 
Coef. 0,483 0,857 1,865 
P-value 0,278 0,048 ** 0,128 
Indep. 
Coef. 4,469 4,723 -2,458 
P-value 0,220 0,167 0,506 
Mutinational 
Coef. 6,772 6,602 -1,377 
P-value 0,085 *** 0,082 *** 0,715 
Freefloat 
Coef. 0,060 0,040 0,005 
P-value 0,340 0,501 0,966 
Constant 
Coef. -11,696 -17,480 -40,701 
P-value 0,351 0,143 0,084 *** 
F-statist.   0,001 * 0,000 * 0,000 * 
R²   0,691 0,710 0,424 
Nº Obser.    34 34 34 
 
Table 19 - Firms with exclusively fixed-based pay  
Reports the estimated coefficients related to Equation 8, considering a reduced sample 
of 26 firms.  In this case, the dependent variable relies exclusively on the fixed 
remuneration earner per non-executive director on the Board. 
 
    Total Pay 
Returns 
Coef. 0,260 
P-value 0,597 
Assets 
Coef. 0,198 
P-value 0,802 
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Indep. 
Coef. 5,115 
P-value 0,363 
Mutinational 
Coef. 7,487 
P-value 0,125 
Constant 
Coef. -6,343 
P-value 0,712 
F-statist.   0,009 * 
R²   0,686 
Nº Obser.    26 
 
Table 20 - Remuneration Committee with exclusively independent members 
Reports the estimated results regarding Equation 9. The main focus will be to 
understand whether or not a Remuneration Committee fully composed by independent 
members, represents a significant aspect regarding the non-executive’s compensation 
packages. The variable “IndRemCommittee” represents a dummy variable which 
assumes the value of 1 if a corporation has an exclusively independent Remuneration 
Committee and 0 if not. The control by industry has been already executed. 
 
    Total Pay Fixed Pay Variable Pay 
Returns 
Coef. 0,126 0,105 -1,702 
P-value 0,709 0,753 0,000 * 
Assets 
Coef. 0,684 1,026 1,842 
P-value 0,173 0,035 ** 0,110 
Mutinational 
Coef. 6,995 6,804 -1,149 
P-value 0,094 *** 0,091 *** 0,765 
IndRemCommittee 
Coef. 3,020 3,082 -0,262 
P-value 0,249 0,322 0,931 
Constant 
Coef. -13,559 -18,861 -42,043 
P-value 0,339 0,168 0,064 *** 
F-statist.   0,000 * 0,000 *** 0,100 *** 
R²   0,67 0,69 0,417 
Nº Obser.    34 34 34 
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Table 21 – The Logit model 
Shows the results regarding Equation 10, where the probability of having solely fixed 
based remunerations was calculated.  
 
    Total Pay 
Returns 
Coef. 0,880 
P-value 0,023 ** 
Assets 
Coef. -0,376 
P-value 0,316 
Level of debt 
Coef. -0,0003 
P-value 0,008 *** 
Freefloat 
Coef. -0,012 
P-value 0,654 
IndRemCommittee 
Coef. -0,026 
P-value 0,983 
Multinational 
Coef. -0,115 
P-value 0,941 
Constant 
Coef. 8,651 
P-value 0,212 
F-statist.   0,170 
R²   0,262 
Nº Obser.   34 
 
